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C M L PRACJXCE
Jay C. Carlisleg

During the Survey year seventeen articles of the CPLR were
amended and three new articles were added.' Also, effective December 1, 1991, Congress has approved important amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 Civil Justice Expenses and Delay
Reduction Plans were adopted by the Board of Judges of the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York.3 Additionally, there have been
significant developments in the decisional law of discovery,4 statute of
limitations,5 sanctions,6 and res judicata.7 These and other areas
should be of interest to the practitioner.

I. NEW LEGISLATION
AND RULES
Space limitations prevent inclusion of an appendix summarizing
all CPLR legislation enacted during the Survey year. The practitioner
should review the table of contents for the various CPLR publications.8 The most important development relates to several changes

t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D., University of California
at Davis; A.B., University of California at Los Angeles; Member, New York Bar.
The 1991 article on New York Civil Practice is dedicated to the Honorable Sybii
Hart Kooper, who was a distinguished justice on the Appellate Division for the Second
Department. Justice Kooper died during the Survey year.
We worked together on the Chief Judge of New York's Task Force on Women and
the Courts. Justice Kooper had a wonderfid sense of humor, great compassion, and extraordinary human strength. The bench and bar of the United States will sorely miss her.
1. See infra notes 8-67 and accompanying text.
2. See infm notes 68-166 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 167-206 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 572-88 and accompanying text.
5. See infm notes 207-335 accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 608-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infm notes 509-31 and accompanying text.
8. The complete text should be available for review in the 1991-92 CPLR publications by Matthew Bender, Gould Publications or West's McKinney Commentaries. Copies of the entire legislative texts may be obtained by contacting the Department of
Governmental Relations. The practitioner should also consider subscribing to the Annual Legislative Bulletin of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The
Bulletin analyzes the merits of the proposed bills and discusses their impact on current
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relating to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 Prior to discussing
these changes, the bench and bar should be alerted to some of the
statutory changes.

A. Section 306-a; New Requirements for Proof of Service
CPLR 306-a became effective on September 1, 1991.10 It requires that the summons and proof of its service be filed with the clerk
of the court within thirty days after service is complete. The new
statute applies to actions commenced in the supreme or county
courts, including third party actions.11 It requires that a copy of the
summons with proof of service be filed with the clerk of the court in
the county in which the action is brought within thirty days after service is complete, regardless of how or upon whom it was served.12
CPLR 306-a applies to all cases pending as of September 1, 1991.13
The deadline for that filing was October 1, 1991. If the filing require
ments are not followed, the statute states that the court shall grant a
nunc pro tunc order to permit a late filing but also states "upon application."l4 If the clerk enters the order without involving a judge, the
late filer will not need to file a Request for Judicial Intervention and
will save the $75 RJI fee.15
laws. It is an excellent research tool and will keep the practitioner abreast of developments in Albany.
9. See infm notes 68-206 and accompanying text.
10. Act of June 12, 1991, ch. 166 Q 381, 1991 MCKINNEY'S SESS.LAWSOF N.Y.
( d e d at N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R 306-a (McKinney Supp. 1991) [hereinafter N.Y.
CPLR]). See also Robert A. Barker, CPLR 5 306-a - Thirty Days to File, N.Y.L.J. Sept.
23, 1991, at 3; David D. Siegel, The New Mandatory Filing Rule: An Oct. 1Filing Could
Avoid Additional Fee, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 26, 1991, at 1; and David D. Siegel, Mandatory
Filing (And Fee Paying) Takes Effect Sept. 1, 1991, 381 N.Y. L. DIG. Sept. 1991, at 1.
11. The new section is similar to the requirement of the Civil Court Act (Q 409). It
requires a filing within fourteen days; however, the nunc pro tunc order in the Civil Court
Act must be served on the defendant, even one in default, who is then given an additional
period of time to answer. CPLR 306-a does not contain a similar provision.
12. See supm note 10.
13. The new act is applicable according to Q 406 of the same session law to all actions "pending on or commenced on or after Sept. 1, 1991, provided however, that for
purposes of this section service of such summons made prior to such date shall be deemed
to have been completed on Sept. 1, 1991."
14. See supra note 10, and accompanying text.
15. Id
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B. Section 310; Substituted Service on Partnerships
Subdivisions (b) and (c) were added to CPLR 310 in 1991.16
They allow substituted service upon a partner being served on behalf
of a partnership.17 Thus the leave and mail and nail and mail provisions of CPLR 30818 are now available for service of summons upon a
partnership. The practitioner should not assume that all CPLR 308
provisions have been incorporated into the new additions to CPLR
310.l9 Since strict compliance with all service statutes in New York is
required, one should carefully comply with CPLR 310.20

C Section 312-a; Service by Mail in New York is Permanent
CPLR 312-a was enacted in 1990 as a two year e~periment.~~
In
1991 the legislature made it a permanent part of New York civil practice. The statute provides for service of summons by first class mail.
Before discussing CPLR 312-a, three key observations are necessary.
First, plaintiffs must successfully use the new service statute within
the applicable statute of limitations period. If less than six months of
life remains in the statute of limitations, a traditional method of service should be used. Second, if the defendant fails to acknowledge
service within thirty days after receipt of the mailed service (plus ordinary mailing time) the plaintiff must complete service by traditional
means. Thus, strict compliance requirements remain important.
Third, service under CPLR 312-a must not be confused with other
CPLR provisions authorizing use of mail.22
16. See Act o f July 15, 1991, ch. 338 $ 1 , 1991 Mc-Y'S
SFSS.LAWS OF N.Y.
( d i e d N.Y. CPLR 310).
17. Id.
18. See Harry Gold, Revised Law Applies to All Foreign Limited Partnerships,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13,1991, at 35, col. 2 ;Steven C. Schwartz, Amended CPLR 3IOServing
of Process on Partnerships, N.Y.L.J., January I S , 1992, at 1, col. 1.
19. Id.
20. I d
21. See N.Y. CPLR 312-a (McKinney Supp. 1990);see also Joseph M. McLaughlin,
Service by Mail in New York, N.Y.L.J. Oct. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1; David D. Siege], The
New Statute on Summons Service by Mere Mail: When To Use It, and When Not to. Part
I , 359 N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,
NOV. 1989, at 1. In 1991 the Legislature enacted the statute
permanently. See Act of July 1, 1991 ch. 249 $ 1, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWS OF
N.Y.
22. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1990) (deliver and mail> N.Y. CPLR 308(4)
(McKinney 1990) (nail and mail); N.Y. CPLR 308(5) (McKinney 1990) (mail by ex parte
order); N.Y. VEH& TRAF.
LAW (5 253 (McKinney 1986) (mail under nonresident motorist statute); N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW (5306(a) (McKinney 1986) (service on a registered
agent).
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It appears that CPLR 3 12-a may be used in all state courts where
the CPLR is applicable. Because the New York State Legislature specifically made similar amendments in section 403 of the New York
City Civil Court Act and the Uniform Court Acts,23 however, it is
unlikely that service by mail can be used in other courts not directly
subject to the CPLR in the absence of legislative approval. The new
statute has been authorized by legislative order in the civil, district,
city, town and village courts.24
CPLR 312-a does not require a process server.25 Mailed service
can be completed by the plaintiff or by his attorney or the attorney's
employee.26 Although CPLR 3 12-a does not specifically provide for
mailing to defendants outside New York, it is compatible with CPLR
313, which permits a summons to be mailed outside New York in the
same manner as service made within the State. Any defendant, with
the exception of those governed by CPLR 30g2' (infants, incompetents and conservatees) may be served by mail. This includes defendants referred to in CPLR 30828 (natural person), CPLR 31029
(partnerships), CPLR 31130 (corporations and certain government entities), and CPLR 31231 (courts, boards and commissions). CPLR
30732 (service on the state) is referred to in 312-a; however, section
307 does not include actions against the state in the Court of
Claims.33
CPLR 312-a contemplates first class mailing only. Proof of mailing is not necessary because proof is the defendant's acknowledgment.
Nonetheless, if costs are later sought, because the defendant avoids
service by mail, it is useful for the lawyer to have his or her secretary
prepare an affidavit of mailing. The plaintiff's mailing must include
the summons, the complaint or a notice pursuant to CPLR 305(b),3*
two copies of the statement and acknowledgment, and a self-addressed return envelope.

23. Siegel, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. N.Y. CPLR 312-a(McKinney 1990).
26. Id.
27. N.Y. CPLR 309 ( M c K i ~ e y1990).
28. N.Y. CPLR 308 (McKinney 1990).
29. N.Y. CPLR 310 (McKinney 1991).
30. N.Y. CPLR 31 1 (McKinney 1990).
31. N.Y. CPLR 312 (McKinney 1990).
32. N.Y. CPLR 307 (McKinney 1990).
33. Id.
34. N.Y. CPLR 305(b) (McKinney 1990).
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Service by mail is complete when the defendant, the defendant's
attorney, or an employee of the attorney mails or delivers a signed
acknowledgment to the plaintiff.35 The statute of limitations will continue to run until that date. If the acknowledgment is complete
within thirty days (plus ordinary h t class mailing time) proof of service is deemed complete under CPLR 306.36 If the action is in
supreme or county court, one must file a copy of the summons and
acknowledgment with the clerk of the county in which the action is
brought within thirty days after the acknowledgment is returned to
the plaintiff.37
If the defendant refuses to acknowledge service under CPLR
312-a the plaintiff must complete service under some other method.
Plaintiff, however, may ask the court to assess the reasonable expense
of other service on the defendant. When another method is attempted, the summons must refer to the prior unsuccessful attempt by
mail. Unfortunately, 312-a does not explicitly provide for attorney's
fees for alternative service. If it can be shown, however, that a defendant frivolously ignores service by mail, sanctions can be sought
under 22 NYCRR 130.38

D. Section 2302 Subpoena Duces Tecum
CPLR 230739 has been amended by deleting subdivision (b) and
providing that a subpoena duces tecum can be complied with by producing a full-sized legible reproduction of the item or items required
to be certified as complete and accurate by either the person in charge
of the library, department or bureau or the person's designee, and no
personal appearance to certify the item or items is necessary, unless
by court order under CPLR 2214(d).m

E. Section 3101, 3406; Medical Malpractice Panels Abolished
Chapter 165 of the Laws of 199141repeals 8 148-a of the Judici-

N.Y. CPLR 312-a (McKinney 1990).
Id
N.Y. CPLR 306-a (McKinney 1992).
N.Y. COMP.CODER & REG.tit. 22, 8 130 (1988) [hereinafter NYCRR].
See Act of July 15, 1991, ch. 389 8 1, 1991 McKINNEY's SESS.LAWSOF N.Y.
(effective January 1, 1992) ( d i e d at N.Y. CPLR 2307 (McKinney 1992)).
40. Id.
41. See Act of June 12,1991, ch. 165 8 47,1991 McKINNEY's SESS.LAWSOF N.Y.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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and amends CPLR 3101(d)(ii)43 and CPLR 3406.44 The
ary
new law abolishes the three person panels used in medical malpractice
panels and was effective October 1, 1991, except in pending actions in
which a formal written recommendation as been signed and forwarded as of that date.45 The OflFice of Court Administration has
amended Uniform Rules 202.2146 and 202.5647which referred to the
panels. An important change for the practitioner to note with respect
to Uniform Rule 202.21(a) is that the certificate of readiness must
accompany a note of issue in a medical malpractice action.48

R Other Changes in CPLR
Additional changes in the CPLR have been made with respect
42. Act of June 12, 1991, Ch. 105, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y.9 47
(repealing N.Y. JUD. LAW 9 148-a, effective October 1, 1991).
43. See Act of June 12,1991, Ch. 165,1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y.9 45
( d i e d at N.Y. CPLR 3101).
44. See Act of June 12, 1991, Ch. 165, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y.
8 46, codified at N.Y.CPLR 3406(b).
45. Id.
46. See N.Y. UNIFORM
RULESOF THE COURT§ 202.21 (McKinney 1992).
47. Id at 202.56.
48. David D. Siegel, 382 N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,
Oct. 1991, at 4.
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to CPLR 302(b),49 321(a),50 3016(I1),~l3 101(d)(l)(ii),52 321 1(a)(1
65 1 1(d),59800760and
4504,5450 18(d),555222(a),565222(a),57552

49. See Act of April 22, 1991, ch. 69, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y. $ 7
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 302(b) (McKinney 1992). This provision was amended to provide that in any preceding under the Family Court Act, $ 10, the family court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident respondent. The amendment provides for
long-arm jurisdiction in chid abuse cases where the abused or neglected child resides or
is domiciled in New York and where the alleged abuse or neglect occurred within the
State.
50. See Act of July 1, 1991, ch. 236, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y. $ 1
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 321 (McKinney 1992)) (amended by adding references to
$8 1809 and 1809-A of the N.Y.C. CIV. (ST. ACT, and the UNIFORM
DIST.(ST. ACT and
CITY Cr.ACT).
the UNIFORM
51. See Act of July 26, 1991 ch. 653, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y. $ 3
(codified at N.Y. INS. LAW $ 2342 (McKinney Supp. 1992)) (amended to replace the
reference to GEN. MUN.L. $ 305 with a reference to ARTS AND CULT. AFF.L. $ 20.09).
52. See Act of June 12,1991 ch. 165,1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. $ 4 5
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 3101 (McKinney 1992)). This provision was amended to delete
the provision allowing a party to condition an offer to disclose an expert witness's name
and make him available for deposition on all parties waiving a hearing of the matter
before the malpractice panel, and the provision specifying that if the offer was conditioned upon a waiver of the malpractice panel's hearing of the matter, the panel shall not
be utilized. The October 1, 1991 date applies only to actions where, as of this date, the
medical malpractice panel members have not signed and forwarded to all the parties a
formal written recommendation relating to the question of liability.
53. See Act of July 26, 1991, Ch. 656, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. $ 4
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 3211 (McKinney 1992)) (amended to replace the reference to
GEN. MUN. L. $ 305 with a reference to ARTS AND CULT. AFF. L. $ 20.09).
54. See Act of July 19, 1991, Ch. 457, MCKINNEY'S SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. $ 1 (codified at N.Y. CPLR 4504 (McKinney 1992)) (amended to add references to "podiatrist"
and "podiatry").
55. See Act of July 26,1991, Ch. 648, MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. $ 2 (codified at N.Y. CPLR 5018 (McKinney 1992)) (adds a new subdivision (d) which permits a
county clerk to adopt a new docketing system utilizing electro-mechanical, electronic or
any other method he or she deems suitable for maintaining the dockets).
56. See Act of July 15, 1991, Ch. 314, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. $ 1
( d i e d at N.Y. CPLR 5222 (McKinney 1992)) (amended to require that a restraining
notice include an original signature or copy of the original signature of the clerk of the
court or attorney who issued it).
57. Id
58. See Act of July 25, 1991, Ch. 582, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. § 6
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 5521 (McKinney 1992)) (allowing courts to give preference for
argument of appeals from orders, judgments or decrees in proceedings brought under
provisions of the Family Court Act if any party or counsel for a minor, who is the subject
of the proceeding, applies).
59. See Act of July 26, 1991, Ch. 648, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 5 3
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 6511 (McKinney 1992)) (adding a new subdivision (d) which
permits a county clerk to adopt a new indexing system utilizing electro-mechanical, electronic or any other method he or she deems suitable for maintaining the indexes).
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G. Additional 1991 Legislative Changes
The practitioner should note additional legislative changes to the
General Associations Law,62 the Insurance Law,63 the Judiciary
LawY64
the Public Officers Law,65 Vehicle and TrafEic Law,66 and the
New York City Civil Court Act.67

H. Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Last years' Survey alerted the practitioner to important changes
made in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.68 It is worth another
brief mention because many members of the bar remain unaware of its
key points. Fortunately Professor John B. Oakley of the California at
Davis Law School has written a litigators piece describing the Act of
60. See Act of July 19,1991, Ch. 449,1991 MCKINNEY'SS m . LAWSOF N.Y.Q 1
(codified at N.Y.CPLR 8007 (McKinney 1992)) (amended by substituting the reference
to "published" with "principally circulated.").
61. See Act of May 24, 1991, Ch. 143, 1991 MCKINNEY'S
S m . LAWSOF N.Y.Q 1
(codified at N.Y.CPLR 8009 (McKinney 1992)) (amended by increasing fees).
62. See Act of June 12, 1992, Ch. 166, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS. LAWSOF N.Y.
5 274 (codified at N.Y.GEN. ASS'NS LAW Q 19 (McKinney Supp. 1992)) (relating to
service of process against an association upon the secretary of state).
63. See Act of July 15, 1991, Ch. 320, 1991 MCKINNEY'SS m . LAWSOF N.Y.Q 2
(codified at N.Y.INS.LAWQ 5102(a)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1992). This amendment adds
new subsection (5) relating to "basic economic loss" and provides that there be an option
to purchase, for an additional premium, an additional $25,000 of coverage which will be
applied to loss of earnings from work and/or psychiatric, physical or occupational therapy and rehabilitation after the initial $50,000 of basic economic loss has been exhausted.
64. See Act of June 12,1991, Ch. 165,1991 MCKINNEY'S
SESS. LAWSOF N.Y.Q 47
(repeals effective October 1, 1991 Q 148-a of the JUD. LAWwhich established medical
malpractice panels).
65. See Act of July 1, 1991, Ch. 212, 1991 McKINNEY's S m . LAWSOF N.Y.Q 2
(amending, effective July 7, 1991, N.Y.PUB.OFF. LAWQ 87(2)(j)).
66. See Act of June 12, 1991, Ch. 166, 1991 MCKINNEY'SS m . LAWSOF N.Y.
5 286 (amending, effective June 12, 1991, VEH. & TRAF.LAW5 251y2) relating to service
of summons on secretary of state in action against non-resident defendant).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y.Q 11
67. See Act of July 26, 1991, Ch. 659, 1991 MCKINNEY'S
(amending, effective November 1, 1991, Q 1812-A of the Act). See also Act of April 22,
1991, Ch. 66, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y.Q 1 (amending, effective January
1, 1992, 5 1900 of the Act); Act of July 23, 1991, Ch. 591, 1991 MCKINNEY'SS m .
LAWSOF N.Y.5 1 (amendig, effective July 23, 1991, 5 1908 of the Act); Act of July 1,
1991, Ch. 261, 1991 MCKINNEY'SSESS.LAWSOF N.Y.Q 1 (amending, effective January
1, 1992, 5 1908(0 of the Act); Act of July 1, 1991, Ch. 249, 1991 MCKINNEY'SS m .
LAWSOF N.Y.5 1 (amending, effective July 1, 1991, 5 1908-a of the Act).
68. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1990 Survey of N Y.Law, 42 SYRACUSE
L. REV.343,
351-353 (1991).
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1990.69 Professor Oakley points out that Congress has narrowed the
right to invoke federal jurisdiction originally or by removal.70 He also
explains the dramatic expansion of the right to invoke the supplemental jurisdiction necessary for a federal court to adjudicate claims
under state law that are transactionally related to litigation in federal
Finally, Professor Oakely discusses the important new
changes in federal venue law.72
During the Survey year several important changes in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure became effective and the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules held a hearing on a number of proposed amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules.73 A Civil Justice Expense and
Delay Reduction Plan was adopted by the Board of Judges of the
Southern District of New York on December 12, 199174and by the
Eastern District of New York on December 17, 1991.75 Also the
President's Council on Competitiveness issued an Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform in America which advocates major changes in the litigation pro~ess.76The bench and bar should also be aware of amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,77 Federal Rules of
Evidence,78 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,79 Federal Bank-

69. See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in The Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of I988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVISL.
REV.735 (1991).
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
74. See Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan as adopted by the Board of
Judges of the Southern District of New York on December 12, 1991 (on file with the
Syracuse Law Review) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. Education Plan].
75. See Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan as adopted by The Board of
Judges of the Eastern District of New York on December 17, 1991 (on file with the
Syracuse Law Review) [hereinafter E.D.N.Y. Education Plan].
76. See A Report from the President's Council on Competitiveness: Agenda For
Civil Justice Reform In America, August 1991 [hereinafter Council on Competitiveness].
See also Michael Wines, Bush Sets Rules to Curb US.Lawyers' Litigation, N.Y. TIMES,
October 24, 1991, at A22; John H. Cushman, Jr., Federal Regulation Growing Despite
Quayle Panel's Role, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 24, 1991, at Al. Most of the proposals in the
Justice Reform Act should be introduced in early 1992 in the U.S. Senate as the Access to
Justice Act of 1992.
77. See H.R. Doc. NO. 78, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
78. See H.R. Doc. No. 76, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
79. See H.R. Doc. No. 79, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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ruptcy Rules.80 Finally, the bar should note that the Second Circuit
Appellate Rules have been amended.81

I. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
On April 30, 1991 the United States Supreme Court ordered that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts (hereinafter "Rule" or "Rules") be amended by including new
chapter headings WII and IX,amendments to Rules C and E of the
Supplemental Rules for certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, new
forms 1A and 1B to the Appendix of Forms, the abrogation of Form
18A, and amendments to Civil Rules 5, 15,24,34,35,41,44,45,47,
48, 50, 52, 53, 63, 72, and 77.82 These changes were transmitted to
the Congress by the Chief Justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $5 2072-7483
and became procedural law through congressional inaction. The
amended Rules apply to all civil actions commenced after December
1, 1991 and all pending proceedings "insofar as just and practicable
. . . ."84 The changes to the Rules include major reforms in the areas
of pleading, discovery, subpoenas and motions. The most important
changes are summarized below.
a Rule 5: Service and Filing
Rule 5 has been amended in three important respects.85 First,
the amended rule requires that a certificate of service be filed with the
court, together with a copy of the papers served. This requirement is
applicable to all post-complaint papers filed unless the court orders
otherwise.86 Second, papers may be filed by facsimile transmission, if
permitted by the local rules of the district court, provided the local
rules are consistent with the standards established by the Judicial
Conference.87 Third, the rule prohibits court clerks from refusing to
accept for filing any paper solely because it is not in conformity with
80. See H.R. Doc. No. 80, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
81. See N.Y.R. OF CT. 661 (McKinney's 1992).
82. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERALRULESOF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
H.R. DOC.
NO. 77, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter CIVIL RULES].
83. Id. See 28 U.S.C. $8 2072-74 (1988).
84. CIVIL
RULES,
supra note 82, at 1.
85. Id. at 55.
86. FED.R. CIV. P. 5. See also CIVIL RIGHTS,supra note 82, at 94-95 (Advisory
Committee Notes).
87. FED. R CIV. P. 5, CIVILRULES,
supra note 82, at 105 (Advisory Committee

Notes).
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the Rules or any local rule or practice.88

b. Rule 15: Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
The amendments to Rule 15 seek to freely allow amendments to
pleadings to correct formal defects such as misnamed or misidentified
~arties.~9
The Rule has been changed so that an amendment to a
pleading relates back to the time of fding when "relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to
the action . . . ." The Advisory Committee notes to this section make
it clear that it is intended to clarify the ambiguity created by the
Supreme Court's decision in Schiavone v. Fortune.9o Thus, Rule 15
should be liberally construed to permit any relation back that is permissible under the applicable limitations law. The Advisory Committee explained "[wlhatever may be the controlling body of limitations
law, if that law affords a more forgiving principle of relation back
than the one provided in this rule, it should be available to save the
claim."9l The provisions in the old Rule 15, which permit a relation
back if the claim or defense asserted arose out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as that alleged in the original pleading, is
retained in the amended rule as an alternative ground for the relation
back of amendments.
Rule 15 has also been revised to permit an amendment to change
or add the name of a party against whom a claim is asserted, so long
as the action against that party arose out of the same circumstances as
those giving rise to the original claim, and the party has either
(a) received actual notice of the action or (b) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake in naming the party in the original
complaint, the action would have been brought against that ~ a r t y . 9 ~
If either of these requirements is satisfied within the time permitted
under Rule 4(m) for service of the complaint, then an amendment
changing or adding the name of a party will be deemed to relate back
to the time of the original filing. This revision overrules the Schiavone

88. FED.R. CIV.P.5, CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 105-06 (Advisory Committee
Notes).
89. CIVILRULES,SUPM note 83 at 56, 11 1-13.
90. 477 U.S.21 (1986); CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 112 (Advisory Committee
Notes).
91. CML RULES,supm note 82, at 112 (Advisory Committee Notes).
92. FED.R. CIV. P. 15, CML RULES,supra note 82, at 112-13 (Advisory Committee Notes).
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c. Rule 24: Intervention
Rule 24 has been revised to require that when the constitutionality of any statute of a State affecting the public interest is drawn in
question in any action in which that State or any agency, officer, or
employee thereof is not a party, the court shall notify the attorney
general of the State as provided in 28 U.S.C. 5 2403.94

d. Rule 34: Production of Documents
Rule 34 has been revised to permit courts to compel non-parties
to produce documents and things or to submit to an inspection as
provided in Rule 45.95 The changes in the Rule are not intended to
preclude an independent action for production of documents or things
or for permission to enter upon land, but it is unlikely that separate
actions will be filed in light of the Rule 34 revision.96

e. Rule 35: Physical and Mental Examinations
Rule 35 has been revised to expand the range of physical and
mental examinations which the court can order.97 The old rule permitted examinations only by physicians.98 The new Rule permits examinations to be conducted "by a suitably licensed or certified
examiner. . . ."99 This suggests that a party can be compelled to submit to an examination by a dentist, a podiatrist, an occupational therapist, or any other professional required to be licensed provided that
the individual is qualified to present relevant testimony on the party's
physical or mental condition.loOIt should be noted that the court has
the responsibility to determine the suitability of the examiner's qualifications, even if the proposed examination is to be conducted by a physician. "If the proposed examination and testimony calls for an
93. CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 112-13 (Advisory Committee Notes).
94. FED.R. CIV.P.24. See CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 115 (Advisory Committee Notes).
95. FED.R. CIV. P. 34. See also CML RULES,supra note 82, at 123 (Advisory
Committee Notes).
96. CML RULES,supra note 82, at 123 (Advisory Committee Notes).
97. FED.R. CIV. P. 35; CNIL RULES,supra note 82, at 126 (Advisory Committee
Notes).
98. CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 126 (Advisory Committee Notes).
99. FED.R. CN. P. 35(c).
100. CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 126 (Advisory Committee Notes).
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expertise that the proposed examiner does not have, it should not be
ordered, even if the proposed examiner is a physician."lOl

J Rule 41: Dismissal of Actions
Rule 41 has been revised to delete language that permitted the
use of the rule as a device to terminate a non-jury action on the merits
when the plaintiff had failed to carry a burden of proof in presenting
the plaintiff's case.lo2 A Rule 41 motion to dismiss on the basis that
the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient as a matter of law should be
treated as a motion for judgment on partial findings, as provided in
revised Rule 52.1°3
g. Rule 44: Proof of Oflcial Records
Rule 44 has been revised to make use of the Hague Public Documents Convention.104 It provides that final certification of a foreign
official record is not required if the record and attestation are certified
as provided in a treaty or convention to which the foreign country
where the official record is located and the United States are both
parties.lO5 It should be noted that this revision changes the former
procedure for authentication of foreign official records only with respect to records from nations that are signatories to the Hague
Convention.

h. Rule 45: Subpoena
Rule 45 has been completely revised. Subdivision (a) is amended
in seven significant respects.106 Paragraph (a)(3) modifies the requirement that a subpoena be issued by the clerk of the court. It permits
attorneys, in addition to clerks, to issue subpoenas. In addition, attorneys representing a party in federal court now have the authority to
issue and serve a subpoena in any federal court nationwide. Consequently the Advisory Committee states, "the amended rule effectively
authorizes service of a subpoena anywhere in the United States by an
p~

--

p~

101. Id. at 126-27.
102. FED.R. CIV. P. 41. See CML RULES,supra note 82, at 128 (Advisory Committee Notes).
103. CML RULES,supra note 82, at 128 (Advisory Committee Notes).
104. FED.R CIV.P. 44. See CML RULES,supra note 82, at 131 (Advisory Committee Notes).
105. CIVIL RULES,SUPM note 82, at 131 (Advisory Committee Notes).
106. FED.R. CIV. P.45; CML RULES,supra note 82, at 143 (Advisory Committee
Notes).
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attorney representing any party."1o7 The revised Rule recognizes the
potential for attorneys to abuse their power to issue and serve subpoenas. Subsection (c) of the Rule imposes an affirmative duty on the
party or attorney responsible for the subpoena to "take reasonable
steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject
to that subpoena."l08 The sanctions include reimbursement of lost
earnings and reasonable attorney's fees.
~ i l 45
e has also been revised to include specific grounds for
quashing or modifying a subpoena. The new Rule protects intellectual property and unretained experts from the apparent abuse of the
subpoena process.lo9 The new Rule authorizes a district court to
quash or m o w a subpoena seeking the disclosure of confidential information or the opinion of an unretained expert unless a "substantial
need" is shown and "reasonable compensation" is provided to the
subpoenaed party. lo

i Rules 47 and 48: Abolition of Alternate Jurors
Rule 47 has been revised to no longer allow alternate jurors in
federal civil cases.lll Rule 47 also now permits a juror to be excused
for "good cause" at any time during deliberations as well as trial.112
This provision may be used without causing a mistrial. In addition,
Rule 47 limits preemptory challenges to the number provided by 28
U.S.C. 5 1870 -currently, three challenges to a party.l13 As a result
of these changes, the Advisory Committee comments, "it will ordinarily be prudent and necessary, in order to provide for sickness and
disability among jurors, to seat more than six jurors."114

j. Rule 50: Judgment As Matter Of Law
Rule 50 has been revised to delete reference to a "directed verdict" or to a "judgment notwithstanding the verdict."llS The revised
107. CNIL RULES,supm note 82, at 144 (Advisory Committee Notes).
108. FED.R CN. P. 45(c)(l).
109. CIVILRULES,supm note 82, at 148 (Advisory Committee Notes).
1 lo. FED. R CIV. P. 45(~)(3)(B)(iii).
11 1. FED. R CIV. P. 47. See CIVILRULES,supm note 82, at 152 (Advisory Committee Notes).
112. FED. R. CIV.P.47(c). See CML RULES,supra note 82, at 152-53 (Advisory
Committee Notes).
113. FED. R CIV. P. 47(b). See also 28 U.S.C. 8 1870 (1985).
114. CIVILRULES,supra note 82, at 154 (Advisory Committee Notes).
115. FED. R. CN. P. 50. See CNIL RULES,supra note 82, at 159, 162.

Heinonline

--

43 Syracuse L. Rev. 90 1992

19921

Civil Practice

91

rule renames these motions "judgments as matter of law."ll6 A party
may move for a judgment as a matter of law on any claim at any time
during a trial after the non-moving party has "been fully heard."l17
Paragraph (a)(l) of the revised Rule specifies that the motion should
be granted if "there is no legally s a c i e n t evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for [the non-moving] party with respect to
that issue . . ."I18 The moving party is responsible for specifically
identifying the basis on which judgment as a matter of law might be
granted. The revised Rule "aims to facilitate the exercise by the court
of its responsibility to assure the fidelity of its judgment to the controlling law . . . ."119

.

k Rule 7Z District Courts and Clerks
Rule 77 has been revised to permit district courts, upon motion,
to prolong the time to appeal in cases where a party's notice of appeal
is filed late because he was unable to receive notice of judgment
against him.120 The amended Rule works in relation to Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 4(a) to allow a district court to enlarge the
time for appeal by fourteen days when it determines that notice of the
judgment was in fact not received by the appellant and that no prejudice would be caused by allowing the appeal.121 The revised Rule
authorizes the prevailing party in the action to serve notice of the
judgment on the losing party to help ensure its receipt.122

I. Rules 52, 53, 63, and 72
Rule 52, has been revised to permit courts to render 'judgment
on partial findings" in bench trials.l23 Rule 53 has been revised to
require masters to serve a notice of the filing of their report on all
parties.124 Rule 63 has been revised to allow cases to proceed before
substitutejudges without regard to the reasons for the original jurist's
inability to continue.125 Rule 72 has been revised to clarify an ambi116. FED.R. CIV. P. 50.
117. Id 5O(a)(l).
118. Id
119. CML RULES,
supra note 82, at 159 (Advisory Committee Notes).
120. Id. at 173 (Advisory Committee Notes).
121. Id.
122. FED.R. CIV.P. 77(d).
123. FED.R. CIV.P. 52.
124. See id 53.
125. See id 63.
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guity concerning the time for objecting to a magistrate's report.126

Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
On November 21, 1991 the Judicial Conference of the United
States' Advisory Committee of Civil Rules met in Los Angeles to consider a number of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Conference has proposed amendments to Rules 1,11,
16, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 43, 54, 56, 58, 83, and 84. The
Conference also has proposed amendments to Rules 702 and 705 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although it is beyond the scope of
this article to comment in detail on the proposed rules, we call the
following items to the readers attention.

2.

a. Rule

Ill27

The proposed revision restates the obligations that a litigant owes
to the court prior to signing and filing a pleading, motion, or other
document. It also provides that these obligations are of a continuing
nature and imposes a duty on the litigant to withdraw allegations and
positions once they are no longer tenable.128 The revised rule also
calls attention to the potential for nonmonetary sanctions and allows
sanctions to be imposed on a person or firm responsible for the presentation, rather than only on the individual signing a paper.12g
b. Rule 26130
The proposed revision mandates that litigants disclose, without
any request, three types of basic information that presently are usually obtained through discovery requests or after pretrial conferences.131 This disclosure relates to persons likely to have significant
information about the claims and defenses, documents likely to bear
significantly on these issues and information concerning any claimed
damages. It also relates to expert testimony. If a litigant fails to make
the required disclosures, he can be subject to imposition of traditional
126. CML RULES,supra note 82, at 172 (Advisory Committee Notes).
127. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at Rule 11,
supra note 73. See also Carlisle Avoiding the Chancellor's Boot: Application of Sanctions
in Federal District and Appellate Court Practice, 18 W E S T C H ~ CO.
R BAR J. No. 4
(1991).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Proposed Amendments at Rule 26, supra note 73.
131. Id.
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sanctions and to preclusion of the use of evidence and notification to
the jury that evidence was not disclosed as required.132
c.

Rule 30133

The most significant changes in this proposed revision involve
the establishment of presumptive limits on the number and length of
depositions. Absent some other directive from the court, as in a
scheduling order, no more than ten depositions may be taken by the
plaintiffs, no more than ten by the defendants, no more than ten by
third-parties, and the actual examination of the deponent is to be limited to six h0urs.13~Thus, it is contemplated that the deposition will
be completed in a single day. The revision also adds provisions
designed to deter improper conduct during depositions such as coaching the deponent through objections and inappropriate directions not
to answer.l35 Finally, the revision makes it easier to take depositions
by video or audio recording by eliminating the need to obtain court
approval for such depositions. A litigant can notice a deposition to be
taken by any of the three standard methods - stenographic, video
recording, or tape recording.136

The proposed revision permits the use at trial of depositions of
expert witnesses without having to account for their unavailability.138
This revision should particularly be useful with respect to depositions
of treating physicians. It will also be a cost-saving measure for other
experts, who under the changes in Rules 26 and 30 will be deposed
only after a detailed report has been provided to other parties. Another change is to eliminate the risk of nonattendance at a deposition
when a party that has received inadequate advance notice of a deposition is unable to obtain a court ruling on its motion for a protective
order before the deposition.139

132. Proposed Amendments, supra note 73.
133. Id. at Rule 30.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Proposed Amendments at Rule 32, supra note 73.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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e. Rule 33140
The proposed revision provides that, absent leave of court or the
agreement of the parties, no more than fifteen interrogatories may be
served by one party upon another.141 Subparts are counted in determining the number of interrogatories permitted. It should be noted
that this number is less than prescribed in the local rules for the
Southern District of New York. It should also be noted that given the
disclosures required by revised Rule 26(a), interrogatories will no
longer be needed to obtain much of the information that has typically
been sought in such discovery requests.

f: Rule 34l42
The proposed revision provides that documentary requests may
not be made until after the requesting party has made its initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l) and such disclosures have been made by, or
are due from, the other party.143 The parties are authorized to extend
the time to provide access to the documents when this will not interfere with schedules ordered by the court.144

g. Rule 3614=
This revision provides that requests for admission may not be
made until after the requesting party has made its initial disclosures
under Rule 26(a)(l) and such disclosures have been made by, or are
due from, the other party.14'5

h. Rule 37147
The proposed revision makes changes to complement the provisions for disclosure contained in Rule 26(a). If a party fails to comply
with Rule 26(a), he may be precluded from offering such evidence on
a motion under Rule 56 or at trial, and the jury can be informed of
such failure.148
140. Id at Rule 33.
141. Id
142. Proposed Amendments at Rule 34, supra note 73.
143. Id.
144. Id
145. Id at Rule 36.
146. Id
147. Proposed Amendments at Rule 37, supra note 73.
148. Id.
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i. Rule 43149
The proposed revision provides in nonjury cases, particularly
with respect to the testimony of experts of lay witnesses concerning
historical matters not in substantial dispute, the court can expedite
trial and make the testimony more understandable if all or portions of
the direct testimony are presented in the form of a written report prepared in advance by the witness.150 The revision specifically authorizes this practice, subject, however, to thi: right of cross-examination
in the traditional manner.151
j.

Rule 56152

The proposed revision enhances the utility of the summary judgment procedure. It eliminates ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
current language.153 It also sets a single, understandable standard for
determining when summary adjudication is proper, establishes national procedures to facilitate fair consideration of Rule 56 motions;
and addresses gaps in the rule that have frequently fmstrated its intended purposes.
3. Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America

The President's Council on Competitiveness has recommended
fifty specific changes to our current civil litigation system.lS4 These
changes may be implemented by legislation, by amendment to the
rules of civil procedure and evidence, and through administrative actions including an executive order. The Justice Department will coordinate the Administration's civil justice reform effort.lS5 The areas of
recommendations include (1) voluntary dispute resolution, (2) discovery, (3) more effective trial procedures, (4) expert evidence reform, (5) punitive damages, (6) improves use of federal judicial
resources, (7) enhanced incentives for encouraging meritorious litigation, (9) reducing unnecessary burdens on federal courts, and

149. Id. at Rule 43.
150. Id.
151. Id
152. Proposed Amendments at Rule 56, supra note 73.
153. Id.
154. See Council on Competitiveness Report, supra note 76. See also Cushman,
supra note 76.
155. Id.
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(10) eliminating litigation over poorly drafted legislation.156
Of particular interest to the New York bench and bar are recommendations relating to punitive damages and discovery. The Council
urges that there be a judicial determination of the amount of punitive
damages, and that a cap be placed on punitive damages.lS7 In discovery matters the Council suggests the adoption of numerical limits on
discovery requests and that additional discovery be governed by market incentives.158 The Council also proposes a "loser pays'' rule in
discovery motions and requires that parties consult prior to seeking
court intervention in discovery disputes.159 On October 22, 1991
President Bush ordered the Government's lawyers to abide by twenty
of the fifty rules mentioned in the Council's report.160 The Presidents's order affects civil cases to which the government is a party.
This includes about one fourth of all 56,000 civil cases filed in all
federal courts in the United States and about sixteen percent of federal and state civil appeals.161 The new discovery rules require Government lawyers to offer to exchange "core information" with
opposing parties.162 This includes the names and locations of persons
that are relevant to the lawsuit, and the location of important docurne11ts.16~ The new rules also mandate that government lawyers attempt to resolve disputes over discovery requests with opposing
lawyers before taking the dispute to a judge.164
President Bush has asked that all fifty of the Council's proposals
on civil litigation be adopted nationwide, stating these changes would
"restore sanity" to a civil justice system that the President claims is
stifling innovation and raising the cost of doing business.165
4.

Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans

On December 12, 1991, the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan was adopted by the Board of Judges of the Southern

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Council on Competitiveness Report, supm note 76.
Wines,supm note 76.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wines,supra note 76.
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District of New York.166 0,December 17, 1991, a similar plan was
adopted by the Board of Judges of the Eastern District of New
York.167 Some of the changes proposed in these plans are similar to
those proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

a. The Southern District Plan
The plan does not apply to Multi-district Litigation cases. These
cases are subject to special rules in the Manual For Complex Litigation and are generally supervised by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation.
The Southern District will implement the following procedures
or practices.168 First, there shall be early judicial case management in
all cases.169 Second, a simplified case assignment system and a differential case management system based upon whether a case is "Complex," "Standard" or "Expedited" will be created.170 The designation
will be made by the judge and it will be based upon case information
statements filed by the parties of by a determination made at a case
management conference. Third, an initial case management conference should be held in all cases within 120 days of filing the complaint.171 Fourth, in cases determined to be expedited, defined
categories of relevant documents will be produced automatically; discovery will be limited; and the case will be set for trial within one year
of service of the complaint, unless good cause is shown.172 Fifth, in
complex and standard cases, a case management plan will be developed at the case management conference.173 The plan should be issued following the conference, and a magistrate shall be designated
for each such case. Sixth, for complex and standard cases, the court
should set a fhm trial date which generally will be as early as reasonable and no later than eighteen months after the filing of the complaint.lT4 Seventh, pre-motion conferences should be considered by

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See S.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 74.
See E.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 75.
See S.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 74.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
S.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 74.
Id.
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judges where advisable.175 Eighth, judges should decide motions with
reasonable promptness.176 Ninth, although individual judges are responsible for handling their own dockets in a timely manner, imbalances in the number of pending cases may lead to reassignment of
cases or the provision of additional resources.177 Tenth, the court
shall request authorization for additional magistrate judges where appropriate.178 Eleventh, at the initial case management conference, a
discovery plan should be formulated.179 Twelfth, the court should
adopt guidelines for deposition practice, interrogatories, requests for
documents and discovery of experts.lgOThirteenth, guidelines should
be established for cases brought by prisoners pro se.181 Fourteenth,
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery obligations should be
imposed where appropriate.182 Fifteenth, appeals from discovery rulings by magistrate judges on discretionary issues are disfavored.183
Sixteenth, a two year program of mandatory court-annexed mediation
will be established for expedited cases, and a sample of other civil
cases.184 Seventeenth, for complex and standard cases, a voluntary
court-annexed arbitration program will be considered.185 Eighteenth,
the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms shall be monitored by the Advisory Group.186 Finally, the court should commence
a program modernizing all existing courtrooms, chambers and court
offices.lS7
b.

The Eastern District Plan

The Eastern District did not adopt a formal system of differentiated case management whereby different types of cases would be assigned to different tracks.188 The Eastern District Judges did adopt
procedures relating to (1) reassignment, (2) setting of trial dates,

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id
Id
Id.
S.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supm note 74.
Id
Id
Id
Id
S.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 74.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
E.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 75.
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(3) discovery and pretrial practice, (4) mandatory pretrial disclosure,
(5) motion practice, (6) pretrial conferences, (7) complex litigation
alternative dispute resolution (which includes court annexed arbitration, early neutral evaluation of cases, trials before magistrate judges,
settlement conferences, special masters, court-annexed mediation and
publicizing alternatives to trials), (8) sanctions, (9) attorneys' fees
and (10) trial practices (which addresses the use of expert witnesses,
jury selection, bench trials and miscellaneous practices).l89 Of particular interest to the practitioner are the Eastern District plan's reference to discovery, sanctions and trial practices.

i Discovery
For an eighteen month period, in every civil case filed on or after
February 1, 1992, excluding social security, habeas corpus, andpro se
cases, as well as civil rights cases in which there is an immunity defense available, the parties must make automatic disclosure of certain
items.190 These disclosures generally should be made by a plaintiff
within thirty days after service of an answer to its complaint and by a
defendant within thirty days after serving its answer to the complaint.191 Failure to make the required automatic disclosure may result in sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b).lg2
There will be limitations on discovery. In every civil case on or
after February 1, 1992, a limitation on the number of interrogatories
shall be established by agreement of the parties or by court order.193
In the absence of any agreement or court order, the number of interrogatories, including subparts, shall be presumptively limited to fifteen.194 In every civil case on or after February 1, 1992 a limitation
on the number of depositions shall be established by agreement of the
parties or by court order.195 In the absence of any agreement or court
order the number of depositions shall be presumptively limited to ten
per side (plaintiffs constitute one side, defendants one side, and all
other parties one side).l96 The Eastern District Plan also provides for

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id
Id
Id
Id

E.D.N.Y.Reduction Plan, supra note 75.
Id
Id
Id
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some mandatory pretrial disclosure.197

ii. Sanctions
Prior to seeking sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, a party alleging a
Rule 11 violation, shall give timely notice to the alleged violator at the
time the violation is committed. If this alleged offending conduct
does not cease, the party victimized may move for sanctions.198 In
addition, a Rule 11 motion must be a separate application to the court
and may not consist of a request for sanctions tacked on to another
motion. 199

iii. Trial Practices
In bench trials, the court may direct that an expert's direct testimony be submitted in writing and that only the cross-examination be
done before the fact-finder.200 In bench trials, where appropriate, expert testimony may be taken by deposition.201 Bench trials shall be
encouraged. In every civil case on or after February 1, 1992, the parties shall be advised that they may be given a date certain for trial if
they consent to trial before a magistrate judge.=02 The court may require the parties in all cases to file a pretrial statement of stipulated
facts and of facts that are disputed.203 Any objection to documentary
evidence shall be made by motions in limine if such documentary evidence has been designated at least ten days prior to trial.204 Except
exhibits used for the purpose of impeachment or rebuttal, shall be
marked prior to trial.205Where appropriate, the court may order that
direct testimony be submitted in writing.

All attorneys who practice in the United States District Courts
for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York should obtain
copies of the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans by
contacting the clerks office for each court. Adoption of these plans
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id
E.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 75.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
E.D.N.Y. Reduction Plan, supra note 75.
Id
Id.
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will substantially improve the delivery of justice in the Southern and
Eastern Districts.

During the Survey year the Court of Appeals followed the majority rule that application of a statute of limitations is usually defendant-orientated.206 The Court issued eleven statute of limitations
opinions and ruled against plaintiffs nine times. Thus, the Court continues its long tradition of narrowly applying statutes of limitations
and deferring to the legislature to correct any wrongs.207
However, the Court of Appeals did rule that attorney malpractice claims are governed by the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions.208 Also, the courts in the appellate division issued
important opinions involving the applicable statute of limitations peand the federal courts in New
riod in attorney malpractice ca~es,~W
York issued several instructive opinions.210 Finally, the United States
Supreme Court adopted a uniform statute of limitations period for
10(b) and Rule 10(b-5) action under the Securities and Exhange Act
of 1934.211

I.

A. Court of Appeals
CPLR 214-a: The Continuous Treatment Doctrine212

The applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine requires
that there be more than merely a continuing relationship between the
206. See CHASE& BARKER,CML L ~ G A T I OIN
N NEW YORK(2d Ed.) at 299
("New York's application of its statutes of limitations is often defendant oriented").
207. See Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478
N.Y.S.2d 853, cerf. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); Steinhardt v. Johns Manville Corp., 54
N.Y.2d 1008,430 N.E.2d 1297,446 N.Y.S.2d 244, cerf. denied and appeal dismissed sub
nom, 456 U.S. 967 (1982); Rosenberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008,
450 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, cerf. denied and appeal dkmhed, 456 U.S. 967
(1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d
920 (1979); Schwartz v. Heydon Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212,188 N.E.2d 142,
237 N.Y.S.2d 714, remittitur amended, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d
896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270
N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
208. Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & NcHugh, P.C., 78 N.Y.2d 700,586 N.E.2d. 1014,
579 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1992). See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 306-35 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 306-12 and accompanying text.
212. N.Y. CPLR 214a (McKinney 1992)
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physician and the patient.213 The underlying rationale is the existence
of a "continuing trust and confidence" which warrants the tolling of
the limitations period.214 In this respect the Court of Appeals continued to restrictively apply the doctrine during the Survey Year.
In Nykorchuck v. Henriques,215 the Court of Appeals held the
doctrine did not apply. The plaintiff's suit was commenced more
than eight years after a lump on her breast was discovered and more
than four years after her last appointment with defendant in connection with another medical conditi0n.~l6The Court based its decision
on the plaintiff's failure to allege facts which would support a finding
that a course of treatment was established in connection with her
breast condition.217 The Court pointed out that the only course of
treatment alleged was related to a separate medical condition, endometriosis.218 Judge Kaye, in dissent, stressed the ongoing relationship between plaintiff and her gynecologist and concluded that the
defendant's acts of alleged negligence, combined with wrongful omissions, may constitute a continuous course of treatment, separate and
apart from any treatment for endometriosis.219
In Massie v. Crawford,22'J plaintiff sought to recover damages for
personal injuries, which allegedly were caused by the presence of an
intrauterine birth control device ("IUD"). The defendant gynecologist moved for partial summary judgment contending that claims of
malpractice were barred by the two and one-half year statute of limitations.221 The trial court and appellate division denied the motion,
holding that the continuous treatment exception applied and
presented a question of fact for the jury.222 The Court of Appeals
reversed on the grounds that plaintiff's subsequent visits to her doctor
were for routine gynecological examinations and were not therapy to
correct a medical condition. Judge Hancock dissented and stated
"The decisive question pertains to the purpose and nature of plain213. See Richardson v. Orentreich, 64 N.Y.2d 896, 898,477 N.E.2d 210,211,487
N.Y.S.2d 731,732 (1985) (citing Coyne v. Bersani, 61 N.Y.2d 939,940,463 N.E.2d 371,
372, 474 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (1984)).
214. Richardson, 64 N.Y.2d at 898, 477 N.E.2d at 21 1, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
215. 78 N.Y.2d 255, 577 N.E.2d 1026, 573 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1991).
216. Nykorchuck, 78 N.Y.2d at 257, 577 N.E.2d at 1027, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
217. Id. at 259, 577 N.E.2d at 1028, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 260-61, 577 N.E.2d at 1029-30, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
220. 78 N.Y.2d 516, 583 N.E.2d 935, 577 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1991).
221. Marsie, 78 N.Y.2d at 519, 583 N.E.2d at 937, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
222. Id.
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tiff's visits to Dr. Crawford after the procedure in 1969 when the IUD
was implanted."223 He noted that plaintiff stated that her subsequent
visits were referable to the continued implantation of the IUD. He
also noted that plaintiff maintained that the visits were made at the
instance of the doctor who advised her to return for follow-up visits
with respect to the IUD. Judge Hancock concluded "That these visits
may have included general examinations or other medical services in
addition to IUD care certainly does not, as a matter of law, make
them 'discrete, complete and routine' examinations unrelated to defendant's follow-up care of plaintiff's IUD condition."224 Thus, there
remained questions of contested fact which Judge Hancock believed
should be decided at trial instead of by motion. Judge Hancock disbecause
~ ~ ~ the alleged continuous
tinguished Nykorchuck v. H e n r i q u e ~
treatment related to a separate medical condition.u6
In Cooper v. Kaplan, plaintiff alleged "that defendant committed
medical malpractice when he prescribed b i i h control pills knowing
that she had previously had phlebitis while taking similar medication."227 Defendant moved to dismiss the action because three years
had passed after the pills were prescribed. Plaintiff argued that the
action was timely because of the continuous treatment doctrine.
Plaintiff's counsel argued that defendant has supplied his client with a
six-month prescription, that she spoke to him on at least two occasions to complain of leg pain, and that he advised her to continue the
medication. The Court of Appeals unanimously held that since the
record did not "reflect that plaintiff contemplated, or had, a continuing patient physician relationship with defendant," the Court could
not consider the legal question concerning whether the conduct mentioned by plaintiff's counsel could constitute continuous treatment.228

2. CPLR 214-c: Date of Discovery229
In Enright v. Eli Liz& h Co., the Court of Appeals, speaking
through Chief Judge Wachtler dismissed the claim of a brain dam-

223. Id at 521, 583 N.E.2d at 938, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 225 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 521, 583 N.E.2d at 938, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
225. 78 N.Y.2d 255, 577 N.E. 1026, 573 N.Y.S.2d 434.
226. M&e, 78 N.Y.2d at 516, 583 N.E.2d at 935, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 223 (citing
Nykorchuck, 78 N.Y.2d at 255, 577 N.E.2d at 1026, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 434).
227. 78 N.Y.2d 1103, 1104, 585 N.E.2d 373, 374, 578 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (1991).
228. Cooper, 78 N.Y.2d at 1104, 585 N.E.2d at 374, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
229. N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney 1992).
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aged granddaughter of a woman who had ingested DES.230 According to the allegations of the complaint, the infant plaintiff's injuries
were caused by her premature birth, which in turn resulted from damage to her mother's reproductive system caused by the mother's in
utero exposure to DES. The Court stressed its concern that the rippling effects of DES exposure may extend for generations. Chief
Judge Wachtler proclaimed "[ilt is our duty to confine liability within
manageable limits. Limiting liability to those who ingested the drug
or were exposed to it in utero serves this purpose."23* Judge Hancock
filed a vigorous dissent. He stated:
Today, however, in what appears to mark an abrupt change in the
course of New York strict products liabiity jurisprudence, a cutback on recent precedent and a rejection of policy established by
the Legislature and accepted by our Court, the majority denies
[plaintiff] the right to

Judge Hancock explained that the plaintiff should have the same right
to sue drug makers for her injuries as does her mother. He stated:
"Is there any basis in the law or social policy or any principled reason
in justice and fairness for holding that she -unlike other members of
the class - should not be permitted to prove her case."233
In Anderson v. Eli Lilly Co., plaints, whose spouse allegedly suffered certain injuries to her reproductive system due to her in utero
exposure to the DES drug, commenced an action against manufacturers of DES, asserting a derivative cause of action for the loss of cons o r t i ~ m Defendants
.~~~
moved for a summary judgment, contending
that plaintiff could not recover since his spouse's exposure to DES
and her resultant injuries occurred before the marriage. The motion
was granted by the trial court and afibmed by the appellate division.235 The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's contention that the
Legislature's enactment of the new discovery statute of limitations
(CPLR 214-c) created a cause of action. The Court stated that "[tlhat

230. 77 N.Y.2d 377,570 N.E.2d 198,568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1991). Chief Judge Wachtler framed the issue as follows: "The question in this case is whether the liabiity of
manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol [DES] should extend to a so-called 'third
generation' plaintiff, the granddaughter of a woman who ingested the drug." Enright, 77
N.Y.2d at 380, 570 N.E.2d at 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
231. Id. at 387, 570 N.E.2d at 203, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
232. Id. at 389, 570 N.E.2d at 205, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
233. Id. at 389, 570 N.E.2d at 204, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
234. 79 N.Y.2d 797, 588 N.E.2d 66, 580 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1991).
235. Anderson, 79 N.Y.2d at 798, 580 N.E.2d at 67, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
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provision merely temporarily revived certain previously time barred
claims-it did not act to create any new causes of acti0n."23~

3. CPLR 214(3) Replevin237
In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, the Court of
Appeals held that the three year replevin statute of limitations began
to run when the true owner demanded return of stolen art~ork.238
The Court rejected a discovery date accrual even though the artwork
was missing for more than 20 years before demand and the owner had
not reported it lost or stolen. The Court held that even though the
artwork was possessed by a good faith purchaser for value, since the
true owner had no duty of diligence to search for artwork, the discovery rule was not applicable. The Court also stressed that selection of
an earlier time to foreclose rights of a true owner to recover stolen
property would encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art.239
CPLR 204(a): Stay of Commencement of Action240
In Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authoriq, plaintiff was injured on the tracks of the Long Island Railroad after discharge from a
LIRR train.241 He failed to serve a summons and complaint on the
public authority until more than one year and thirty days after his
claim accrued. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled his claim untimely
and correctly dismissed.242 The Court reminded the bar that a person
has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action
against a public authority.243 The Court also reminded the bar that
the complaint must contain an allegation that at least thirty days have
elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and
that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the
The Court noted that this stay of thirty days is not counted
as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff may serve a com4.

236. Id. at 799, 588 N.E. at 68, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
237. N.Y. CPLR 214(3) (McKinney 1992).
238. 77 N.Y.2d 311, 313, 569 N.E.2d 426,427, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (1991).
239. Solomon, 77 N.Y.2d at 320,569 N.E.2d at 431,567 N.Y.S.2d at 628 ("To place
the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner and to foreclose the rights of that
owner to recover its property if the burden is not met would, we believe, encourage illicit
trafficking in stolen art.").
240. N.Y. CPLR 204(a) (McKinney 1992).
241. 79 N.Y.2d 777, 587 N.E.2d 269, 579 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1991).
242. Burgess, 79 N.Y.2d at 778, 587 N.E.2d at 269, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
243. Id.
244. Id
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plaint at any time up to one year and thirty days after the claim has
accr~ed.~~5
The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that because
he was injured on a Friday night and could not present his claim to
the defendant's claim office until the next Monday, he was actually
stayed for thirty-three days and was entitled to one year and thirtythree days to commence his action.246
5. CPLR 212 Article 78 Proceedings247

There is a four month statute of limitations for a proceeding
against a body or officer after the determination being reviewed becomes final or binding upon the petitioner.248 The four month period
is inapplicable if the body or officer is acting in its legislative capacity.249 The limitation period begins to run - becomes "final" and
"binding" - as soon as the aggrieved party is notified, and not when
Also, some perithe action directed by the determination is tal~en.2~~
ods of time are less than four months.
In Long Island Pine Barrens Society, Inc. v. Planning Board of
the Town of Brookhaven,251 petitioners challenged the approval of a
subdivision project. They commenced an Article 78 proceeding more
than 30 days after the Board's preliminary approval of a development
project but within 30 days of the final approval. The supreme court
granted a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely and the appellate
division afl[irmed. It held that when the Board granted preliminary
approval it had completed its environmental review of the project.
Thus, any proceeding challenging the environmental review should
have been commenced within 30 days of the Board's filing of its decision giving preliminary approval.252 The Court of Appeals pointed
out that Town Law section 282 governed, and that the question was
whether the time for commencing a proceeding under section 282 begins to run upon the filing of preliminary plat approval or the final

245. Id
246. Id
247. N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKinney 1992).
248. Id
249. Id
250. See Carlisle, CivilPractice, 1986Survey of N Y.Law, 38 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 67,
104-05 (1987).
251. 78 N.Y.2d 608, 585 N.E.2d 778, 578 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1991).
252. Long Island Pine Barrens Society, Inc, 78 N.Y.2d at 611, 585 N.E.2d at 780,
578 N.E.2d at 468.
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approval decision where the challenge to the plat is solely on environmental grounds and the environmental review procedure is completed
prior to the filing of the decision approving the preliminary plat. The
Court of Appeals held that under such circumstances, petitioners
were required to begin their Article 78 proceeding within thirty days
of the filing of the preliminary, not the final plat approval decision.253
In New York State Ass'n of Counties v. Axelrod,254 appellant's
filed an Article 78 proceeding to annul a Medicaid reimbursement
recalibration regulation. The Court of Appeals held that appellant's
action was timely because it was commenced within four months of
its members receipt of the rate recomputation notices which, for the
first time, apprised the facilities of their actual reimbursement rates.255
The Court stated the "DOH determination could not be deemed 'final' for Article 78 purposes until NYSCAC's members were able to
ascertain the consequences of the recalibration regulation so that its
impact could be accurately assessed, including awareness whether the
facilities were aggrie~ed."z~~
6. CPLR 208: Infancy Toll and Continuing Treatment Doctrine257

In Daniel J. v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,25* the
Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division and held that the ten
year extension afforded to infants by CPLR 208 runs from the initial
negligent act and not from the end of any period of subsequent continuous treatment.259
On November 17, 1978 petitioner gave birth to Daniel J. at a
hospital operated by respondent. On December 4, 1978, he underwent emergency surgery there to correct a strangulated hernia. After
two follow-up visits to the hospital's out-patient clinic in December
1978, Daniel was readmitted and additional surgery was performed,
followed by continued treatment at the hospital for the next three

253. Id at 613, 585 N.E.2d at 781, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
254. 78 N.Y.2d 158, 577 N.E.2d 16, 573 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1991).
255. New York State As'n of Counties, 78 N.Y.2d at 165, 577 N.E.2d at 20,
573N.Y.S.2d at 29.
256. Id at 165, 577 N.E.2d at 20, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
257. N.Y. CPLR 208 WcKinney 1992).
258. 77 N.Y.2d 630, 571 N.E.2d 704, 569 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1991).
259. Daniel J., 77 N.Y.2d at 630, 571 N.E.2d at 706, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 398 ("The
issue is whether the maximum 10-year extension of the Statute of Limitations afforded to
infants by CPLR 208 runs from the initial negligent act or from the end of any period of
subsequent continuous treatment*').
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months. Daniel lost both testicles and will require lifelong hormonal
treatment. Petitioner filed a proceeding asking for leave to serve a late
notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law 5 50-e(5), and
also immediate leave to serve a summons and complaint.260 In support of her request to serve the notice, petitioner argued that Daniel J.
had received "continuous treatment" for his hernia and testicle
problems until March 15, 1979 and, therefore, the action commenced
December 12, 1988 was timely under CPLR 208.261 The supreme
court agreed and the appellate division afEhned.262
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners argument that the action accrued at the end of Daniel J.'s continuous treatment and that
the ten year toll for infancy began to run at that time. The Petitioner
contended that at the time CPLR 208 was enacted the cause of action
in continuous treatment actions accrued at the end of the treatment,
not the beginning.263 She argued that rule should be applied and that
when it is applied, the ten year infancy toll did not begin to run until
the end of Daniel J.'s continuous treatment.264The Court of Appeals
explained that there was support for the petitioners position in the
legislative history discussing the proposed amendment of the infancy
t0ll.~65Nonetheless, the Court concluded that its holding in McDermott v. Tone266 required that the claim be dismissed.267

260. Id at 633, 571 N.E.2d at 705, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 397. (Petitioner claimed "respondent was guilty of malpractice because of its doctors' initial failure to diagnose the
undescended testicle problem immediately after Daniel J.'s birth and based on a notation
in respondent's records indicating that the infant's right testicle may have subsequently
been compromised during the December 4, 1978 surgery.").
261. Id at 633, 571 N.E.2d at 706, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
262. Id
263. See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151,187 N.E.2d 777,237 N.Y.S.2d
319 (1962) (holding cause of action in continuous treatment actions accrued at the end of
the treatment, not the beginning). This rule was changed in McDermott v. Torre, 56
N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1982) (holding an action in medical
malpractice accrues at the date of the original negligent act or omission; subsequent continuous treatment does not change or extend the accrual date but serves only to toll the
running of the applicable Statute of Limitations).
264. Daniel J., 77 N.Y.2d at 635, 571 N.E.2d at 706, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
265. Id. at 635, 571 N.E.2d at 707, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
266. 56 N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1982).
267. Daniel J., 77 N.Y.2d at 635, 571 N.E.2d at 707, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 399. The
Court held that "[tlo apply the Borgia definition of accrual to CPLR 208 now would
perpetuate the illogical consequences of the rule we corrected in McDerrnott and create
an unwarranted exception for accrual applicable only to infants' claims." Id at 635, 571
N.E.2d at 707, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (citations omitted).
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Z CPLR 208: Infancy
In Hernandez v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., the
Court of Appeals was faced with the difficult question of whether the
statute of limitations in a wrongful death action was tolled by the
infancy of the sole distribute of decedent's estate.269 The complaint
had been served after expiration of the one year ninety day statute of
limitations then applicable to claims against the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation. The action was dismissed as untimely by the trial court and reinstated by the appellate divisi0n.~7O
The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Kaye, pointed
out that the appellate division held that the statute of limitations on
the wrongful death claim was tolled until the guardian was appointed.271 The appellate division also held that where the sole distributee is an infant, no one is eligible to receive letters of
administration and bring a wrongful death action as personal representative of the estate until a guardian is appointed.272 In addition,
the appellate division noted supreme court's error in concluding that
there were other distributees and overruled its own prior decision in
Cruz v. Mt Sinai Hospita1.273
The appellate division then granted leave to appeal, certifj.ing the
following question: "Was the order of this Court, which modified the
order of the supreme court, properly made?"274 The Court of Appeals answered that question in the affirmative, "concluding that the
statute of limitations was tolled until the appointment of the infant's
guardian."275 Judge Kaye explained that under the EPTL,276 plaintiffs have two years, measured from the date of death in which to
bring a wrongful death action.277Judge Kaye noted that at the time
the present action was commenced, however, a one year ninety day
statute of limitations applied to actions brought against this municipal

268. N.Y. CPLR 208 (McKinney 1992).
269. 78 N.Y.2d 687, 689, 585 N.E.2d 822, 822, 578 N.Y.S.2d 510, 510 (1991).
270. Hernandez, 78 N.Y.2d at 687, 585 N.E.2d at 822, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
271. Id 689-90, 585 N.E.2d at 823, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
272. Id. at 690, 585 N.E.2d at 823, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
273. 61 A.D.2d 915, 402 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1978).
274. Hernandez, 78 N.Y.2d at 690, 585 N.E.2d at 823, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
275. Id.
276. N.Y. Esr. POWERS& TRUS~S
LAW8 5-4.1 (McKinney Supp. 1992) Fereinafter "EPTL"].
277. Hernandez, 78 N.Y.2d at 690, 585 N.E.2d at 823, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
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defendant.278 Therefore, unless that limitations period was tolled,
plaintiff's action was not timely. Judge Kaye stated:
The confluence of the pertinent EPTL, SCPA and CPLR provisions in this case thus gives rise to an unusual -perhaps unique problem. EPTL 5-4.1 grants the personal representative procedural authority to bring the wrongful death claim; SCPA sections
1001 and 707 make it impossible for anyone to assume that role
until a guardian is appointed for the infant sole distributee, and
CPLR 208 speaks of tolling the Statute of Limitations when the
person entitled to bring the action is under a disabiity at the time
of accrual.279

Judge Kaye reasoned:
We decline to reach that unnecessarily harsh result, and instead
would construe the toll of CPLR 208 to apply until the earliest
moment there is a personal representative or potential personal
representative who can bring the action, whether by appointment
of a guardian or majority of the distributee, whichever occurs

firSt.280
Judge Kaye concluded that the infant-sole distributee should have the
benefit of the toll provided by CPLR 208.281
Judge Alexander, joined by Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge
Titone, dissented.282 He explained that the majority legislative interpretation constituted nothing less than sheer judicial legislation.
Judge Alexander focused solely on CPLR 208 and argued that the
infant's claim should be dismissed because the representative was not
under the disability of infancy.283 This reasoning fails to consider that
it was impossible for a representative to be appointed until the appointment of a guardian. The claim was for the infant's sole benefit
and but for his infancy he would otherwise be the representative.284
278. Id
279. Id at 693, 585 N.E.2d at 825, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 511-12.
280. Id
281. Id
282. Hernandez, 78 N.Y.2d at 695, 585 N.E.2d at 826,578 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
283. Id
284. Id
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8. CPLR 213: Six Yearsfor Contract Actions Governs Claimsfor
Legal Malpractice285
In Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, RC,286 the Court of
Appeals afErmed a decision by the appellate division for the Third
Department which refused to dismiss a legal malpractice claim filed
four years after the cause of action arose. The appellate division concluded the case was governed by the six year statute of limitations for
contract claims but held that an "express promise to obtain a specific
result" was required.287 The Court of Appeals unanimously ruled that
a lawyers "implied promise to exercise due care" in providing legal
services is enough to sustain a breach of contract action.288 Thus, the
Court held that the choice of the applicable statute of limitations was
properly related to the remedy rather than to the theory of liability.289

B. Appellate Divisions
Two appellate division decisions held that the six month extension under CPLR 205(a)290 cannot be invoked to file late notices of
claim.291 Two appellate divisions applied the relation back doctrine
under CPLR 203(b)292and one appellate division refused to do so.293
-

285. N.Y. CPLR 213 (McKinney 1992).
286. 78 N.Y.2d 700, 586 N.E.2d. 1014, 579 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1992).
287. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 705, 586 N.E.2d at 1015, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
288. Id
289. Id The practitioner should note that "[tlo the extent the legal malpractice
claim seeks damages different from or greater than those customarily recoverable under a
breach of contract claim, CPLR 214(6) will govern." Id at 708,586 N.E.2d at 1019,579
N.Y.S.2d at 329.
290. N.Y. CPLR 205(a) (McKinney 1992)
29 1. See Dreger v. N.Y.S. Thruway Auth., 177 A.D.2d 762, 575 N.Y.S.2d 743 (3d
Dep't 1991) ( failure to comply with condition precedent to valid commencement of action is fatal and does not trigger ameliorative tolling of statute of limitations) and Matter
of David Lipinski v. County of Broome, 175 A.D.2d 369, 572 N.Y.S.2d 98 (3d Dep't
1991) (six-month tolling provision of statute of limitations operates as a toll following
termination of action and not following denial of motion; consequently CPLR 205(a) has
no application to motion for leave to serve late notice of claim under General Municipal
Law).
292. See Mondello v. New York Blood Center, 175 A.D.2d 718,665 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1st Dep't 1991) (appellate division reversed supreme court and held plaintiff's claim was
interposed against Blood Collection Center at the time his complaint was served on the
hospital); Bruns v. Village of Catskill, 169 A.D.2d 963,564 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1991)
(claim asserted against a new party related back to the date plaintiff's claim was interposed because new claim arose from the same transaction and unity of interest and actual
notice requirements were satisfied).
293. See Kaczmarek v. Benedictine Hosp., 176 A.D.2d 1183, 575 N.Y.S.2d 617 (3d
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In Golub v. Baer, Marks & Upham,294 the Second Department held
that the six year statute of limitations is applicable in legal malpracThe appellate division stated:
tice ca~es.~95
Where the action is to recover damages to pecuniary interests and
arises out of the contractual relationship of the parties, the six-year
Statute of Limitations applies, even though the allegations in the
complaint are phrased in terms of professional malpracti~e.~g~

In Newman v. Orentreich,297 the First Department held that the
continuous treatment doctrine was not applicable to a patient who
received a series of silicone injections in her face for treatment of acne
scars and the effects of aging and who later claimed that the injections
had disfigured her. The appellate division explained there was no indication that the physician and patient contemplated the patient's uninterrupted reliance on the physician's observations, directions,
concern and responsibility of overseeing her progress.298
In DeLeon v. Hospital of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine,
the First Department held that a cause of action alleging that a hospital was negligent in its hiring of an employee who later committed
malpractice is one which sounds in negligence, rather than malpractice, and is therefore subject to the longer three year statute of limitations.299 Two appellate division decisions refused to apply the
equitable estoppel doctrine.300 In Coopersmith v. Gold, the Third Department, in a case transferred from the Second Department under
the backlog program, held the doctrine could not be applied in a lawsuit against plaintiff's former psychiatrist.301 Similarly in Spinosa v.
Weinstein, the Second Department held that the doctrine could not be

Dep't 1991) (plaintiffs' designating unknown medical doctors as John Doe defendants in
their original wrongN death complaint against hospital did not toll running of statute of
limitations because relation back doctrine was not applicable).
294. 172 A.D.2d 489, 567 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1991) (appellate division also
held that the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the Statute of Limitations, as
evidenced by an invoice from the defendant to the plaintiffs for legal services performed
in connection with earlier legal services).
295. Golub, 172 A.D.2d at 489, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
296. Id. (citations omitted).
297. 169 A.D.2d 546, 564 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1st Dep't 1991).
298. Newman, 169 A.D.2d at 546, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
299. 164 A.D.2d 743, 566 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1st Dep't 1991).
300. Coopersmith v. Gold, 172 A.D.2d 982, 568 N.Y.S.2d 250 (3d Dep't 1991);
Spinosa v. Weinstein, 168 A.D.2d 32, 571 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't 1991).
301. Coopersmith, 172 A.D.2d at 983, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
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applied in a lawsuit against plaintiff's podiatrist.302 Finally, in Bogle
v Mann, the Third Department reminded the bar that the four month
limitation under CPLR 217303commences to run - becomes ''final"
and "binding" - as soon as the aggrieved party is notified, and not
when the action directed by the determination is taken.3"

C Federal Practice
Last year's Survey 305 discussed the Second Circuit's ruling in Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, which adopted a uniform federal statute of limitations for actions brought under section lob of the SEC
Act of 1934.306 During the Survey year, the Second Circuit held in
Welch v. Cadre Capital ("Welch N'y, that the Ceres ruling was not
retroactive.307 In Lamp5 Pleva, Lipkin, Pnrps & Petigrow v. Gilberts0n,~08the Supreme Court held that there should be a uniform limitations period for all claims arising under section 10(b) and Rule 10(b5) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that those actions must now
be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation, and in any case within three years after such violation, as provided for other express causes of action under the 1934
Act and the Securities Act of 1933.309 The Supreme Court gave retroactive application to the new rule, applying it to litigation in which
the new rule was announced.310 The Court remanded Welch I for
reconsideration in light of the Lamp5 Pleva holding. The Second Circuit in Welch II held that the application of the ruling adopting a
uniform federal statute of limitations for actions bright under section
lob of the Securities and Exhange Act of 1934 is retroactive.311
In Kulzer v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., the Second Circuit held
that the failure to include a statute of limitations defense in a pretrial
motion and raising of the defense in a "boilerplate" manner did not
amount to a waiver of the limitations defense.312 The Second Circuit
302. Spinosa, 168 A.D.2d 32, 571 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't 1991)
303. N.Y. CPLR 217(1) (McKinney 1992)
304. 167 A.D.2d 721, 562 N.Y.S.2d 885 (3d Dep't 1990).
305. See Jay A. Carlisle Civil Practice, 1990 Survey of New York Law, supra note 68,
at 384 (1991).
306. 918 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Ci.1990).
307. 946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1991).
308. 1 1 1 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
309. Lamps Pliva, 1 1 1 S.Ct at 2775.
310. I d at 2786. See also Welch I . , 946 F.2d at 186.
311. Welch 11, 946 F.2d at 186.
312. 942 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1991).
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also held that New York CPLR 205(a) (six month extension) was
applicable to a claim under New York tort law brought in federal
court, which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because diversity was lacking.313
In Schmidt v. Bishop, Chief Judge Brieant considered whether a
federal district court sitting in a diversity case should apply the
"delayed discovery" doctrine in child sex abuse cases.314 Chief Judge
Brieant recognized that victims of child sexual abuse often do not realize until years later either that they have been abused at all or the
scope of their injuries.315 Nonetheless, he refused to adopt such a rule
because there was no authority for it under New York State law.316
Chief Judge Brieant also refused to apply the doctrines of equitable
estoppel317 and duress.318
Finally, the practitioner should be alerted to 28 U.S.C. 8 1658
which enacts a general four year statute of limitations respecting civil
actions arising under Acts of Congress that do not specifically set
forth a period of limitations.319This provision applies only to causes
of action arising under legislation which Congress enacts after December 1, 1990.320Thus, the new statute is not retroactive. Also, the
new statute does not consider whether there should be tolling provisions applicable to federal statutes of limitations and does not incorporate applicable state tolling provisions by reference. The
practitioner is reminded that the new statute is not applicable in diversity cases where state limitation periods and tolling provisions are

313. See Ditaey v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 921 E2d 421 (2d Cir. 1990)
314. 779 E Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For similar decisions in the state courts, see
Bassile v. Covenant House, 152 Misc. 2d 88,575 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991);
Buipee v. Buipee, 152 Misc. 2d 466, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359, (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1991). See
also, Robert A. Barker, Cause of Action in Child Abuse, N.Y. L.J. Oct. 28, 1991, at 3.
315. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 321.
316. Id. See also Rizk v. a h e n , 73 N.Y.2d 98,104, n. 3,535 N.E.2d 282, -n.3,538
N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 n.3 (1989) (this court has consistently refused to judicially adopt the
so-called 'discovery' rule).
317. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 321 (district court also refused to apply doctrine of
fraudulent concealment on grounds that there was not active concealment as distinct
from the initial wrong) See also Rizk, 73 N.Y.2d 98, 535 N.E.2d 282, 538 N.Y.S.2d 229,
233 (fraudulent concealment claim fails when "plaintiff relies on the same act which
forms the basis of his negligence claim").
318. Id. (district court rejected argument that the statute was tolled because plaintiff
was under duress because duress was not an element of the cause of action asserted). See
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 E2d 698,722 (2d Ci.1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987).
319. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1658 (1985).
320. Id.
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D. Notice of Claim Provisions
Some limitations of time are not statutes of limitations but are
actually conditions precedent. These time liinitations require that the
plaintiff do an act other than commencing an action prior to the expiration of a stated time period. If the act is the filing of a notice of
claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove compliance with the condition precedent.
In Parks v. Hutchins, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate
division's decision that the defendant City of New York was not entitled to prior written notice pursuant to the so-called pothole law.322
Four appellate division decisions denied motions by plaintiffs to file
late notices of claim. In Copeland v. New York City Housing Authority, the First Department held that law office failure was not a s~&cient excuse for failure to timely file a notice of claim under General
Municipal Law section 50-e(5).323 The First Department also held
that a hospital dietary aide was not entitled to file a late notice of
claim against the city under GML section 50-e(5)324because the City
had no control over the City Health and Hospitals Corporation and
could not have had actual notice of the accident by virtue of information contained in workers' compensation claims forms.325
In Pantelup v. City of New York, the Second Department held
that the supreme court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in
denying application for leave to file late notice of claim where the
record demonstrated that about nine months elapsed prior to plaintiffs seeking leave to file the late notice.326In Quintero v. Town of Bab-

321. For a fuller discussion of the new federal statute of limitations see Siegel, The
Statute of Limitations in Federal Practice, Including the New "General" One in Federal
Question Cares, 134 F.R.D. 481 (1991).
322. 78 N.Y.2d 1049, 581 N.E.2d 1339, 576 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1991). See also N.Y.
ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE9 7-201[c][2] [formerly 9 394-1.0[2]]. The Court of Appeals
also held that "the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that defendant committed negligent acts which constituted a proximate cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiffs." Parks, 78 N.Y.2d at 1051, 581 N.E.2d at 1340, 576
N.Y.S.2d at 85.
323. Copeland v. New York City Housing Auth. 173 A.D.2d 335, 335, 575
N.Y.S.2d 283, 283 (1st Dep't 1991).
324. Skelton v.City of New York, 176 A.D.2d 664, 575 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't
1991).
325. Id at 664, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
326. 176 A.D.2d 932, 575 N.Y.S.2d 371, (2d Dep't 1991)
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ylon, the Second Department reversed the supreme court and held
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could not be used to excuse an
untimely filing of a notice of claim.327
Three supreme court decisions permitted late notice of claim filing under General Municipal Law 50-e328and two supreme courts
permitted late notice of claims in other matters. In West v. New York
City Health and Hospitals Corp.., the supreme court granted plaintiffs
motion for an order directing the respondents to accept as timely a
notice of claim served January of 1991 that related to the infant plaintiff's birth in March 1986.329 The court distinguished cases denying
late notice, noting that the legislative intent was to prevent stale
claims, which was not shown here.330 In Leggio v. Islip Public School
District, the Supreme Court permitted a late notice of claim filing on
the grounds that the respondent had actual knowledge of the accident
as well as the essential facts constituting the claim on the day of the
incident.331 In Alvarado v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,
the supreme court granted plaintiff's motion to file a late notice of
claim under GML section 50-e(5)on the grounds that the short delay
caused by plaintiff's lack of English was excusable.332 In Kutsak v.
New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.., a late notice of claim was
allowed despite lack of medical &davits.333 Finally, in The Matter of
Susan A., an HIV patient was granted application to file late notice of
claim more than ten years after the alleged negligence.334

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The most important decisions rendered during the Survey year
relate to subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts. In FreeportMcMoran, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and held that addition of a
limited partnership as a plaintiff did not destroy diversity jurisdic-

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

172 A.D.2d 527, 567 N.Y.S.2d 870 (2d Dep't 1991).
N.Y. GEN.
MUN.LAW8 50-E (McKinney Supp. 1992) [hereinafter "GML"].
151 Misc. 2d 66, 67, 572 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1991).
West, 151 Misc. 2d at 69, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
206 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1991, at 25 (Sup.Ct., SufTolk Co.).
206 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1991, at 33 (Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co.).
205 N.Y.L.J., June 25, 1991, at 24, (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.).
206 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1991, at 24 (Sup.Ct., Nassau Co.).
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tion.335 The Court distinguished its holding from CI. Carden v.
Arkoma Associates336 on the grounds that complete diversity of citizenship existed at the time the action was commenced.337 The
Supreme Court stated "[wle have consistently held that if jurisdiction
exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not
be divested by subsequent events."338
In Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit
held for the first time that a foreign sovereign's nonpayment to a foreign plaintiff of a debt payable in the United States was sufiicient to
establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.339 In A.RA. Tours, Inc. v Whitchurch, the Second Circuit held that the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement
under 28 U.S.C. 5 1332 was applicable to an alleged punitive damage
claim in a trade secret case.340 The Second Circuit reminded the
bench and bar that the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the
claim is apparently made in good faith.341 It must appear to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify di~missal.34~
In Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enterprises, Inc., the Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that the right to remove a state court action to federal court on diversity grounds is statutory, and must
therefore be invoked in strict conformity with statutory requirem e n t ~ .The
~ ~ case
~ presented a novel question of civil procedure:
whether compliance with the Local Rules of a federal district court is
a prerequisite to the timely jiling of a notice of removal under the
removal statute.344The Second Circuit answered this question in the
afknative but excused departure from the local rules on the grounds
of fairness.345Nonetheless, the Somlyo case stands for the proposition
that the bar must be familiar with the local and business rules of the
federal court wherein the removal notice is filed.346

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

11 1 S. Ct 858, 859 (1991).
110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990).
Freeport-McMoran, 11 1 S. Ct. at 860.
Id at 860.
941 E2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991).
937 E2d 82 (2d Cu. 1991).
A.F.A. Tours, 937 F.2d at 82.
Id.
932 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1991).
Somlyo, 932 F.2d at 1045.
Id.
See id.
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In Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., the Second Circuit reversed a
determination by the district court that it did not have ancillary jurisdiction to consider applications for attorney fees and disbursements
with respect to a settlement fund deposited in India.347 The circuit
court ultimately held that the Indian funds were exempt from the attorney's charging lien under principles of in rem jurisdicti0n.3~~
Nonetheless, the case is important because it permits a federal district
court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction after a foreign court has ac~ 9 Altimari pointed out in his
cepted jurisdiction over a m a t t e ~ ~Judge
concurring opinion that "In my view, the majority opinion fails to
properly adhere to our earlier pronouncement that, following the forum non conveniens dismissal, the district court 'cease[d] to have any
further jurisdiction over the matter.'350 Judge Altimari also noted
that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over a matter creates the
potential for shared jurisdiction which is unrealistic.351
Last year's Survey discussed the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990,352and stressed that the Act made significant subject matter jurisdictional changes. We refer the reader to Professor John B.
Oakley's excellent article entitled Recent Statutory Changes In the
Law Of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements
Acts of 1988 and 1990.353 Professor Oakely points out that Congress
has "enacted (1) a modest narrowing of the right to invoke federal
jurisdiction originally or by removal; (2) a significant expansion of
the right to invoke the 'supplemental' jurisdiction necessary for a federal court to adjudicate claims under state law that are transactionally
related to litigation in federal court; and (3) a dramatic liberalization
of the law of federal venue."3" Professor Oakely's piece should be
mandatory reading for a federal litigator.

B. Jurisdiction
A review of the cases published during the Survey year indicate

347. 927 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991).
348. Chesley, 927 F.2d at 62.
349. Id.
350. Id at 67-68.
351. Id at 68 (citing In re Union Carbibe Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809
F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 871 (1987)).
352. See Jay A. Carlisle, CiviI Practice, 1990 Survey of New York Law, supm note
68, at 351-53.
353. See Oakley, supra note 69.
354. Id. at 735.
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that New York state and federal courts are restrictively applying principles of general and specific jurisdiction. Also, federal district courts
issued many opinions interpreting CPLR 301 and 302. Finally, the
Appellate Division for the First Department decided the most significant cases involving commercial and tort actions under CPLR
302(a)(1).355

1. CPLR 301: General Jurisdiction356
Under CPLR 301, personal jurisdictions based on physical presence, domicile, consent, or "doing business" permit New York courts
to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action irrespective of whether it arises from the defendant's contacts with New
York.357 The doing business concept was discussed during the Survey
year by the Second Circuit in Landoil Resources v. Alexander & Alexander Serv., Inc., wherein the Second Circuit held that the presence of
a permanent locale in the State of New York is not a prerequisite to
the exercise of jurisdiction under CPLR 301.358The court stated "the
issue of whether a defendant has such a systematic and continuous
contact with New York as to be tantamount to presence within the
state is a fact-sensitive determination requiring a balancing of all relevant factual circu~nstances."~~~
Although the court recognized that
the third party defendants conducted many activities in New York in
connection with their substantial and continuous solicitation of business, it concluded that the absence of other activities of substance in
New York precluded the assertion of general jurisdiction by the dis~ circuit court also rejected the argument that the
trict ~ 0 u r t . 3The
third party defendants were doing business in New York through an
agent or subsidiary.361
In Klinghofler v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for consideration of
whether the Palestine Liberation Organization was doing business in
. ~ court
~ ~ stressed that an organization is "doing busiNew Y ~ r k The
355. See Lisec v. Lenhardt, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 8, 1992, at 21, co1.3.
356. N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
357. Landoil Resources v. Alexander & Alexander Sews., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 565
N.E.2d 488, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1990)
358. 918 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Ci. 1990) (as amended, Jan 2, 1991).
359. Landoil Resources, 918 F.2d at 1046.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. 937 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Ci. 1991).

Heinonline - - 43 Syracuse L. Rev. 119 1992

120

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 43:77

ness" under CPLR 301 when it is engaged in "such a continuous and
systematic course" of activity that it can be deemed to be "present" in
New York.363 The Second Circuit stated:
Whether this test is met depends on the aggregate of the organization's activities; the key question is whether 'the quality and nature' of the defendant's contacts with New York 'make it
reasonable and just according to 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' that it be required to defend the action in
New Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~
The circuit court pointed to the substantial contacts the PLO has with
the state of New York, but held only those contacts not conducted in
furtherance of the PLUS observer status may properly be considered
as a basis of jurisdiction.365 The Second Circuit rested this decision
on two grounds. First, were the PLO not a permanent observer at the
United Nations, it would not be able to enter New York.366 Second,
and more importantly, "basing jurisdiction on the PLO's participation in UN-related activities would put an undue burden on the ability
of foreign organizations to participate in the UN's aEairs."367
Two federal district court decisions remind the bar that CPLR
301 jurisdiction requires some evidence of an unlicensed foreign corporation having an office, real estate, bank accounts and employees in
New York.368 Findy in Tuxxedo Network v. Hughes Communications Carrier Services, Inc., Judge Cedarbaum reminded the bar that a
foreign corporation may be subject to general CPLR 301 jurisdiction
under the doctrine of Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd. 369 In this
respect, Judge Cedarbaum held that the New York representative of a
nonresident defendant need not be the official agent of the
defendant.370
363. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 50-51.
364. Id at 51.
365. Id.
366. Id
367. Id.
368. See Marks v. Farm and Wilderness Foundation, 753 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Volkswagen De Mexico, S.A. v. Germanischer Lloyd, 759 F. Supp. 1053
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
369. 753 F. Supp. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Gelfnd, 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert denied, 390 U.S. 966 (1968).
370. Tuxedo Network, 753 E Supp at 514.
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2. CPLR 302: Longarm Jurisdiction
There were four instructive opinions on CPLR 302(a)(l) jurisdiction during the Survey year. In First National Bank And Tmst Company v. Wilson, the appellate division reversed the supreme court's
decision that it had in personam jurisdiction.371 The appellate division held that longarm jurisdiction cannot be asserted over a nondomiciliary who was never physically present here and who never agreed
to provide any goods or services here, other than a promise to guarantee payment by another nondomiciliary.372 In Home Box Ofice, Inc.
v. Baum, the First Department held that in-state negotiation and execution of afEliation contracts and letter agreements in connection with
a cable programmer's provision of services demonstrated purposeful
activities from which defendants benefit so as to justify jurisdiction.373
Also, in Torrioni v. Unisul, Inc. the First Department held that a
Florida corporation was subject to long-arm jurisdiction in New York
pursuant to the "contracts anywhere" provision of CPLR
302(a)(1).374 The defendant manufactured a machine in Florida
which allegedly caused an injury in New Y0rk.37~In addition, the
defendant contracted to sell that and other machines to New York
and thereafter arranged for direct shipments of those machines.376 Finally, in Glastechnische Industrie GmbH. v. Lenhardt Maschinenbau
BmbH, et aZ., the First Department reminded the bar that a suit
against a nondomiciliary under the long-arm statute must arise out of
the contacts enumerated in CPLR 302(a)(1)."7 This decision, which
was decided on December 31, 1991, demonstrates that the burden is
on the party asserting jurisdiction to show the existence of some articuable nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action
sued ~pon.37~
In Hatch v. Tran, the Second Department held that a challenge
to in personam jurisdiction is distinct from a claim that plaintiff did
not properly serve process on the defendant.379 The appellate division
also held that a challenge to the basis must be pled with particularity
371. 171 A.D.2d 616, 567 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1st Dep't 1991).
372. First National Bank, 171 A.D. at 616, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
373. 172 A.D.2d 222, 568 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1st Dep't 1991).
374. 176 A.D.2d 623, 575 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep't 1991).
375. Torrioni, 176 A.D.2d at 623-24, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67.
376. Id. at 624, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
377. 173 A.D.2d 70, 577 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1st Dep't 1991).
378. Glartechnische, 173 A.D.2d at 72, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
379. 170 A.D. 649, 567 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1991).
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or it will be wai~ed.~~O
The appellate division noted that plaintiff was
injured in a multi-vehicle accident in New Jersey while operating a
bus. In a joint answer the respondents raised the affirmative defense
that "the Complaint was not properly served and hence, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over the said defendants herein."381 In response to a
later motion, the respondents cross-moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that there was no basis for jurisdiction over them in
New
The appellate division pointed out that an objection to
personal jurisdiction is waived unless it is raised in the answer or in a
preanswer motion to dismiss, whichever comes first.383 The appellate
division stated:
Since a challenge to the basis of the court's jurisdiction is distinct
from a claim of defective service of process,the respondents were
required to plead this defense with particularity. Fairly read, the
answer raised only the claim of defective service of the complaint;
therefore any contention with respect to the basis of the court's in
personam jurisdiction was waived.384

The Hatch case is a good example of how a defendant who initially
raises a "boilerplate" affirmative defense in his answer that the court
lacks in personam jurisdiction may be later precluded from moving
for summary judgment on more particular grounds for the jurisdictional defect.385

3. In Rem Jurisdiction
In Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., the Second Circuit held that
attorneys, who represented victims of the Bhopal disaster, could not
recover their fees and costs because jurisdiction could not be exercised
with respect to the settlement fund which was on deposit in India.386
The Second Circuit rested its decision on a common law rule which
prohibits state and federal courts from assuming in rem jurisdiction
over a res that is already under the in rem jurisdiction of another
In American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Khan, the
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Hatch, 170 A.D.2d at 650, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74.
Id. at 650, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 649, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 73 (citations omitted).
Hatch, 170 A.D.2d at 649-50, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 73-4.
Chesley, 927 7.2d at 60.
Id. at 67.
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supreme court upheld the attachment of a non-domiciliaries bank account in New York for purposes of obtaining quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.sg8 Although the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant
did not, as in Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc,389 require that payments be
made at a particular bank, the court held that jurisdiction existed in a
contract action because defendant had furnished defendant with the
name and account number of his New York bank.390

C Statutory Requirementsfor Service of Summons
We again remind the bar that New York courts require strict
compliance for service of summons and notice. This is important because a defect in service dismisses the action and if the dismissal occurs after the applicable statute of limitations has expired, there is no
six month grace period under CPLR 205(a).391 Also, CPLR 312-a,
service by mail, has been permanently enacted392 and CPLR 306-a
has been added to require filing of summons with proof of service in
all actions within thirty days of service, regardless of how or on whom
served.393 CPLR 310 has been amended to provide for more liberal
and several federal service cases are worthy
service on partner~hips,39~
of brief mention. Finally, we select the Court of Appeals decision in
Ling Ling Yung v. County of Nassau395 as the plaintiff's case of the
~ear.~96

I. Statutory Requirements Under CPLR 308
New York courts continue to require strict compliance with
CPLR 308.397 Subsection (1) of the service statute requires in hand
personal delivery.398 Subsections (2) and (4) require exact compli-

388. N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 1991, at 23.
389. 62 N.Y.2d 65,464 N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984).
390. American Express, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 1991, at 23.
391. N.Y. CPLR 205(a) (McKinney 1990).
392. See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
393. See supm notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
395. 77 N.Y.2d 568, 571 N.E.2d 669, 569 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1991).
396. See infra notes 439-443 and accompanying text.
397. N.Y. CPLR 308 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). See also Flick v. StewartWarner, 76 N.Y.2d 50, 555 N.E.2d 907, 556 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1990).
398. See Dorfinan v. Leidner, 76 N.Y.2d 956, 565 N.E.2d 472, 563 N.Y.S.2d 728
(1990).
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ance,3g9 and subsection (5) places an onerous burden on the plaintiff
to demonstrate that service is otherwise "impracticable".~
a

CPLR 308(1): In Hand Service

In Ciotti v. King, the Second Department held that petitioner
made a prima facie showing of personal delivery by proof that the
process server entered respondent's home and immediately handed
papers to respondent's wife, who then handed them to respondent in
the presence of the process server.41 This case reminds the bar that
the "general vicinity" exception to the Court of Appeals' ruling in
Macchia v. Russo402 is very limited.

b. CPLR 308(2): Leave and Mail Service
Six appellate division decisions demonstrate the importance of
exact compliance with CPLR 308(2). In Glasser v. Keller the appellate division held that a hospital did not constitute a private surgeon's
"actual place of business", as he was not an employee, but only had
privleges and performed operations on the premises.43 Similarly in
Continental Hosts, Ltd. v. Levine, the Second Department held that
service of process on defendant in an accounting malpractice case was
not suEcient because it was made on defendant's former place of business which he had vacated upon retirement.Another line of cases stressed the importance of complying with
the mailing requirements of CPLR 308(2). In Donohue v. Schwartz,
the First Department reminded the bar that the statute of limitations
is not tolled by delivery of process to a person of suitable age and
discretion where process was not mailed to either defendant's last
known residence or actual place of business.405 With respect to the
mailing requirement, it is essential that it be effected within twenty
399. See Jay A. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1990 Survey of New York Law, supra note
68, at 373-374.
400. Id.
401. 175 A.D. 889, 573 N.Y.S.2d 740 (2d Dep't 1991).
402. 67 N.Y.2d 592,496 N.E.2d 680,505 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986). In this familar case,
a summons was delivered to the defendant's son outside the family house, and the son
entered the house and gave the summons to the father. Macchia, 67 N.Y.2d at 592,496
N.E.2d at 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 591. The Court held that the delivery of a summons to
the wrong person does not confer jurisdiction over a defendant even though he shortly
receives it thereafter. Id
403. 149 Misc. 2d 875, 567 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1991).
404. 170 A.D.2d 430, 565 N.Y.S.2d 222 (2d Dep't 1991).
405. 174 A.D.2d 318, 570 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1991).
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days of the substituted ~ervice.~06
In NYS Higher Education Services Corp. v. Palmeri, the Third
Department held that there was no jurisdiction because the mailing
was made 26 days after the service at defendant's residence, rather
than the required 20 days.47 Similarly in Greenberg v. Rosenberg the
Second Department held plaintiff's action to be time barred for the
following reason:
Although the summons and complaint were delivered to a person
of suitable age and discretion at the appellant's place of business on
December 22, 1986, process was not mailed until December 24,
1986, initially to the wrong address, and again on January 16,
1987, to the correct address.48

Finally, in Pickman Brokerage v. Bevona, the First Department
held that the defendant was not properly served when process was left
with the janitor or office building maintenance employee in the lobby
of defendant's office building.409

c. CPLR 303: Service on Defendant's Agent
In Broman v. Stern, the Second Department held that the mailing of summons and complaint to an attorney for the defendants did
not constitute valid service, absent evidence that the defendants had
in fact authorized their attorney to accept process on their behalf.410
The appellate division stated:
That the attorney for the defendants-respondents claimed that he
was authorized to accept service on behalf of his clients is immaterial under the circumstances of this case. In general, representations made by an individual who accepts the service of process are
not binding on the defendant in the absence of proof that the defendant himself knew of such representation^.^^^

Broman reminds the bar that the agency requirements of CPLR 303
406. Donohue, 174 A.D. 2d at 3 18, 570 N.Y.S. 2d at 542.
407. 167 A.D.2d 797, 563 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep't 1990).
408. 174 A.D.2d 601, 602, 571 N.Y.S.2d 309, 309 (2d Dep't 1991).
409. 149 Misc. 2d 879, 881, 568 N.Y.S.2d 287,288 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991). But
see Costine v. St Vincent's Hospital & Medical Center of New York, 173 A.D.2d 422,570
N.Y.S.2d 50 (1st Dep't 1991) (held that guard at security booth outside private residential community in which defendant lived, by screening process server and representing
that he would pass along legal papers to defendant, exhibited sufficient maturity and
responsibility for effective service of process).
410. 172 A.D.2d 475, 567 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't 1991).
411. Broman, 172 A.D.2d at 477, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
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are limited and that service of a summons and complaint should not
be made on an agent unless done pursuant to CPLR 318.412 Bmman
also reminds the bar that even if a defendant's attorney had been
properly designated as agent for the service of process, mailing a summons and complaint to a person to be served does not constitute valid
service under CPLR 308(3).413
d.

CPLR 308(4): Nail and Mail

New York plaintiffs continue to ignore or disregard Professor
Farrell's advice that service of process under CPLR 308(4) is Good
Old Unreliable Service.414 It is essential that the plaintiff show he has
made "diligent" attempts to make service under subsections 1 and 2
of CPLR 308.415 Five appellate division decisions demonstrate that
subsection 4 of CPLR 308 is fraught with danger.
In Zymantiene v. City of New York, the First Department reversed and remanded on the grounds that service of process was not
proper under CPLR 308(4).416 The process server averred that she
had attempted personal service twice at the resident address and that
the defendant could not be found at the address, the defendant's
whereabouts were never determined, despite the process server's questioning of local residents.417 The appellate division stressed that further investigation was necessary to show due diligence.418
Similarly in Rothenberg v. Julien, the First Department held that
plaintiff's action was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the process server made only one attempt at substituted personal ~ervice.~l9
In Empire Ins. Co. v. Marquez, the Third Department reminded
the bar that wedging of the summons and complaint in the door frame
within the rule permitof a locked screen door was not "&ation"
ting service by affixing the summons to the door of a business dwelling, or usual place of abode.420 The safe method is to & the

412. N.Y. CPLR 318 (McKinney 1992).
413. Broman, 172 A.D.2d at 477, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
414. Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service Under New York's Nail and Mail Statute,
N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1986, at 1.
415. N.Y. CPLR 308 (4) (McKinney 1992).
416. 174 A.D.2d 372, 571 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep't 1991).
417. Zymantiene, 174 A.D.2d at 372, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
418. Id.
419. 172 A.D.2d 216, 567 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 199 1).
420. 168 A.D.2d 810, 564 N.Y.S.2d 232 (3rd Dep't 1991).
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summons with "a nail, tack, tape, rubber band, or some other device
which will ensure a genuine adherence." 421
Two appellate divisions reminded the bar of the importance of
complying with the mailing requirements under CPLR 308(4). In
Kazdan v. Merlis, the Second Department held that plantiffs failed to
prove that the process server exercised due diligence prior to resorting
to substituted service or that he properly fixed and mailed copies of
In addition, no evisummons and complaint to effectuate ~ervice.4~~
dence was presented that service was ever completed by filing proof of
service with the clerk of the
Similarly in Rosato v. Ricciardi,
the Third Department held that timely proof of service was not filed
until the default judgment was sought, well beyond 20 days after the
nailing and mailing procedure.424 The Third Department also noted
that the failure to timely file proof of service was a "mere irregularity"
without jurisdictional impli~ations.4~5However, we note that if the
statute of limitations had expired, plaint8 would be unable to obtain
a six month extension under CPLR 205(a).426
e.

CPLR 308(5): Expedient Service

Should personal delivery, "leave and mail" or "nail and mail"
service all prove to be "impracticable," CPLR 308(5) permits service
to be made " . . . in such manner as the court, upon motion without
notice, directs."427 Although expedient service does not require "due
diligence", three appellate division decisions during the Survey year
indicate that the moving party must demonstrate the "impracticable"
requirement with particular specificity.428
421. Empire Im CO., 168 A.D.2d at 810, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
422. 174 A.D.2d 711, 711,571 N.Y.S.2d 760,761 (2d Dep't 1991).
423. Kazdan, 174 A.D.2d at 711, 571 N.Y.S.2d 760.
424. 174 A.D.2d 937, 571 N.Y.S.2d 633 (3d Dep't 1991).
425. Rosato, 174 A.D.2d at 938, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
426. N.Y. CPLR 205(a) (McKinney 1992).
427. N.Y. CPLR 308(5) (McKinney 1992).
428. See Giannizzero v. Herzel, 170 A.D.2d 647, 567 N.Y.S.2d 70 (2d Dep't 1991)
(appellate division held that despite impracticability of locating passenger, it had not been
shown that service on taxicab insurer, which had no relationship with passenger, was
reasonably calculated to apprise passenger of action pending against him); Rivera v. Mazzola, 169 A.D.2d 827,565 N.Y.S.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1991) (because defendant could have
been personally served pursuant to the long arm statute, personal service was not impracticable and plaintiff was not entitled to expedited service); Dime Savings Bank of New
York, FSB v. Mancini, 169 A.D.2d 964,564 N.Y.S.2d 859 (3d Dep't 1991) (mere showing that defendant had "ducked" service was insufficient for purposes of expedited
service).
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2. Statutory Requirements for Service under CPLR 311
CPLR 311 provides for personal service upon a corporation or
governmental subdivision.429 Thus, service upon any domestic or foreign corporation must be made by serving an officer, director, managing or general agent, cashier or assistant cashier or any other agent
This serauthorized by appointment or by law to receive ~ervice.43~
vice statute was strictly construed by the First Department, which
held that personal service on a corporation was not proper pursuant
to an ex parte order under CPLR 308(5).431 The appellate division
impliedly ruled that CPLR 311 is the pre-emptive method of service
and that the provisions for expedient and substituted service offered
by CPLR 308 are not available for use against corporations.432 The
message is clear, CPLR 308 is for individuals and CPLR 31 1 is for
corporations.
The First Department, in Chow v. Kenteh Enterprises Corporation, reminded the bar twice that service under CPLR 3l l is limited
to the persons designated in the statute.433 The First Department
held that service of process on an attorney who filed the Certificate of
Incorporation and who was listed as the person to whom the Secretary of State should mail a copy of the process served on the Secretary, was insufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction over the
defenda11t.4~~The appellate division stated:
The attorney was not a person authorized to accept service (see,
CPLR 311[1]), nor was the Secretary of State served. Further,
cases such as Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Insurance Co. and the
other authorities relied upon by plaintiff, are clearly inapposite,
since the process server here did not rely upon a n y conduct, procedure, or representation made by the attorney, but had in fact been
instructed by his superiors to make service on the attorney.435

Finally, the bench and bar should be alerted to the First Department's decision in American Home Assurance Co. v. Morris Industrial
Builders, Inc., wherein the appellate division held there that an unli-

429. N.Y. CPLR 31 1 (McKinney 1992).
430. Id. § 31l(1).
431. See LTD Trading Enterprises v. Vignatelli, 176 A.D.2d 571, 574 N.Y.S.2d 745
(1st Dep't 1991).
432. Vignatelli, 176 A.D.2d at 571, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
433. 169 A.D.2d 572, 564 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1st Dep't 1991).
434. Chow, 169 A.D.2d at 572, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
435. Id. at 572, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (citations omitted).
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censed New Jersey process server who was not a resident of New
York could serve legal papers in New Jersey as required by CPLR
313.436 The appellate division found that the defect as to residence
was a mere irregularity and would be disregarded.437
3. Strict Compliance Cases of the Yearfor Plaintzrand Defendant
The strict compliance case of the year for plaintiffs is the Court
of Appeals decision in Ling Ling Yung v. County of Nassau.438 The
Court overruled Horowitz v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn439 and
held that service of process on the County Clerk pursuant to CPLR
31l(4) was not defective due to Section 11-4.0 of the Nassau County
Administrative Code, which requires service to be made on the
County Executive or Attorney.440 The Court, speaking through Chief
Judge Wachtler, noted that "CPLR [loll governs the procedure in
civil judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all
judges, except where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute
. . ."44* Chief Judge Wachtler concluded that CPLR 311 should
govern because "to allow the County to continue to impose more
stringent service of process requirements and to hold attorneys to a
higher standard would undermine the uniformity and compromise the
predictability of the CPLR."442
The strict compliance case of the year for defendants is the First
Department's decision in Rosenblum v. 170 West VillageAssociates.443
In Rosenblum, the appellate division held that the failure to properly
serve a third-party summons necessitated dismissal of a third party
complaint, even though the third-party defendant was also a defendant in a second action commenced by the plaintiff.444 The second ac-

.

436. 176 A.D.2d 541, 575 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1991).
437. American Home Assumnce, 176 A.D.2d at 544, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 16. See also
Todaro v. Wales Chemical Co., 173 A.D.2d 696, 570 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1991) and
Glasser v. Kaswol Construction Corp.,176 A.D.2d 858, 575 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't
1991) (holding that service improper under CPLR 3 11). But see Psathas v. Catskill Reg.
Off-Track Betting,Corp., 173 A.D.2d 1070, 570 N.Y.S.2d 407 (3d Dep't 1991) (holding
service proper under CPLR 3 11 on public benefit corporation when president's assistant
appeared and took the summons).
438. 77 N.Y.2d 568, 571 N.E.2d 669, 569 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1991).
439. 144 A.D.2d 639, 535 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1989)
440. Ling Ling Yung, 77 N.Y.2d at 570, 571 N.E.2d at 670, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
441. Id. at 570, 571 N.E.2d at 670, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 362. See also Barker, Potential
Derailment of lawsuits, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1991, at 3, col. 1.
442. Id. at 572, 571 N.E.2d at 671, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
443. 175 A.D.2d 702, 573 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1991).
444. Rosenblum, 175 A.D.2d at 703, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
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tion had been consolidated with the underlying action.45 The
appellate division, citing Macchia v. Russo446 and Markoff v. South
Nassau Community Hosp. ,44' stated:
It is very basic that, as a general matter, jurisdiction cannot be
obtained over a defendant except through strict compliance with
the statutorily mandated procedures.448
4.

CPLR 312-a and Service by Mail

The bench and bar are reminded that CPLR 312-a was permanently enacted during the Survey year. In this respect we remind the
practitioner not to serve by mail if the statute of limitations has less
than six months remaining prior to expiration.49
The basis for this admonition is evident from the result in Nelson
v. Abbott Laboratories.450 In this case, the defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's toxic tort suit as time-barred and for improper service
of
The court held that service by mail had not been properly made pursuant to CPLR 312-a since the statute of limitations
expired before the defendant's acknowledgments could be returned.452
This lengthy opinion explains why plaintiffs failed to follow or to fully
comprehend the procedures set forth in the new mailing statute and
concludes with the admonition:
Because the acknowledgments were not received by the expiration
of the Statute of Limitations, not only was service under CPLR
312-a defective, it was also untimely.453
In another important case, Meneely v. Hitachi Seiki, USA, the
Second Department reminded the bar that use of mail to accomplish
In
extraterritorial service of process in federal court is impr0per.~~4
Meneely, the appellate division held that under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) service of process is limited to within
the territorial limits of the State in which the district court sits unless

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id.
67 N.Y.2d 592,496 N.E.2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986).
61 N.Y.2d 283,461 N.E.2d 1253,473 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1984).
Rosenblum, 175 A.D.2d at 703, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1991, at 36 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1991).
Nelson, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1991, at 36.
Id
Id at 36.
175 A.D.2d 11 1, 571 N.Y.S.2d 809 (2d Dep't 1991).

Heinonline - - 43 Syracuse L. Rev. 130 1992

19921

Civil Practice

131

service is otherwise authorized by a federal statute or rule.455 Thus,
extraterritorial service of process made prior to January 1, 1990 (the
date New York adopted CPLR 312-a) is impr0per.~~6
Two other "mailing" cases merit mention. In In re Abrams, the
attorney general served a subpoena via telefax to petitioner at his
Manhattan office and other papers by express mail to his Florida residence.457 Petitioner challenged the validity of the service. The
supreme court held that the challenge to service must be sustained
under CPLR 308.4" The court granted the motions without prejudice to re-serve but made it clear that service was improper.459 In
Broman v. Stern, the Second Department held that mailing a summons and complaint to the defendant's attorney was not proper service even though the attorney had represented that he was authorized
to accept service.460

5. Related Service Tips
Service of process under New York Vehicle and T r a c Law
("VTL"), section 253 allows the practitioner to serve a summons
upon the Secretary of State if the plaintiff includes the defendant's
out-of-state address.461 In Squire v. Greenberg, the First Department
held that willful misrepresentation of one's address at the time of a
motor vehicle accident estopped defendants from claiming defective
service through the Secretary of State under the VTL.462 Similarly in
Sherrill v. Pettiford, the Second Department held that a motor vehicle
licensee who failed to comply with the statute requiring notice to the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of a change of residence within ten
days of the change was estopped from challenging the propriety of
service made to the former address.463
In Zimmerman v. Mingo, Second Department held that a defendant claiming lack of personal jurisdiction failed to meet his burden of
proving that he changed his New York domicile after he enlisted in

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Meneely, 175 A.D.2d at 112, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
Id
N.Y.L.J., March 28, 1991, at 26 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991).
Abmms, N.Y.L.J., March 28, 1991 at 26.
Id.
172 A.D.2d 475, 567 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't 1991).
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.LAW 8 253 (McKinney 1986).
173 A.D.2d 362, 569 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1st Dep't 1991).
172 A.D.2d 512, 567 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't 1991).
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the Army and was stationed in Kentucky.464 The appellate division
based its decision on the general rule in New York, i.e., military service does not affect a persons's domicile unless he manifests a clear
intent to change it.465 Finally, in Peterson v. IBJ Schroder Bank &
Tmst Co., the First Department reminded the bar that a summons is
jurisdictionally defective when it does not contain a description of the
nature or basis of the action and is not otherwise accompanied by a
complaint.466

6 The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention mandates that service abroad on a defendant who is a citizen of a signatory nation must satisfy not only the
requirements of New York State's service statutes, but also the service
~ ~ Convention is not aprequirements of the Hague C o n ~ e n t i o n .The
plicable to citizens of nations who have not ratified it, nor is it applicable if service is made upon the defendant or the defendant's agent
within the United States.48 A forum selection clause may void application of the Convention.469
In Philip v. Monarch Knitting Machine Corp., the First Department held that service of process by registered mail upon a Japanese
corporation at its principal place of business in Japan was in conformity with the Hague Convention.470 In another matter the First Department held that an order of the Surrogate Court directing a nonparty Italian citizen to testify at a deposition in New York was invalid
for failure to follow the Hague Convention.471

Z Service of Process in Federal Practice
Three decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
464. 171 A.D.2d 662, 567 N.Y.S.2d 142 (2d Dep't 1991).
465. Zimmerman, 171 A.D.2d at 662, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
466. 172 A.D.2d 165, 567 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dep't 1991).
467. See Vazquez v. Sund Emba A.B., 152 A.D.2d 389, 548 N.Y.S.2d (1989). See
also Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association, Service of
Process Abroad: A Nuts and Bolts Guide, 122 F.R.D. 63 (1988) (discussing the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, November 15, 1963).
468. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
469. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 694. See also Jay A. Carlisle, N X Civil Practice, I988
Survey of N X Law, 40 SYRACUSE
L. REV.77, 108-09 (discussing Hague Convention).
470. 169 A.D.2d 603, 565 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dep't 1991).
471. In the Matter of the Application of Francesca v. Agusta-Vacca-Graffagni, 171
A.D.2d 595, 567 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1991).
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make it clear that when a plaintiff sues the United States he must
serve the Attorney General of the United States within 120 days after
filing his complaint as required under Rules 4(d)(4) and 4(j).472 In
McGregor v. US.,the plaintiff sued a V.A. Hospital under the Federal
Tort Claims Act seeking damages for her husband's wrongful death,
which she claimed resulted from negligent treatment at the hospital.473 On the same day plaintiff filed her complaint, she properly
served the United States Attorney by having a copy of her summons
and complaint personally delivered to his office.474 Plaintiff did not,
however, make any attempt within the 120-day period to serve the
Attorney General in Washington by registered or certified mail.475
Plaints's complaint was dismissed by the district court and when she
refiled it, the statute of limitations had r ~ n . 4 ~The
6 Second Circuit
held plaints's first complaint was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that her second complaint was properly dismissed with
prejudice on the ground that it was time barred.477
In National Development Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., the Second
Circuit held that a person can have two or more "dwelling houses or
usual places of abode," for purposes of the federal rule permitting
substituted service.478 The circuit court reject Adnan Khashoggi's
claim that service at his New York City apartment was improper because his dwelling or usual place of abode was at his home in Saudi
Arabia.479

D. Forum Non Conveniens
There were seven important appellate division decisions during
the Survey year which interpret and apply the provisions of CPLR
327(a). In addition, the Second Circuit reversed a district court and
held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be applied.

472. See McGregor v. United States, 933 F.2d 156 (2d C i . 1991); Zankel v. United
States of America, 921 F.2d 432 (2d C i . 1991); Frasca v. United States, 921 F.2d 450

(1991).
473. 933 F.2d 156 (2d C i . 1991).
474. McGregor, 933 F.2d at 164.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 159.
477. Id.
478. 930 F.2d 253 (2d C i . 1991).
479. National Development Co., 930 F.2d at 258. The circuit court left open the
question of whether the service would have been valid if Khashoggi had not been actually
living at the Olympic Tower apartment when service was effected. Id.
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Also, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important decision on the
enforceability of forum selection clauses.

1. CPLR 327(a)
CPLR 327(a) permits a court to dismiss any action if it finds that
"in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in
another forum . . . ."4S0 The Court of Appeals has held however, that
the availability of an alternative forum is not an absolute precondition
for dismissal.481 The Court of Appeals has also ruled that "a court
does not have the authority to invoke the doctrine on its own
motion."482
During the Survey year the Third Department reminded the
bench and bar that a trial court must first determine its personal jurisdiction over a defendant before undertaking a forum non conveniens
analysis.483 In addition, several important decisions by the First Department make it clear that a plaintiff's choice of forum should not be
disturbed absent other factors which strongly favor the defendant.484
Similarly, the First Department decisions indicate that the plaintiff's
New York residence is the most significant factor in a forum non conveniens analysis.485 For example, in Gomez Munoz v. American Paczfic Mining, New York Inc., the First Department held the denial of
a CPLR 327(a) motion was not an abuse of discretion even though
plaintiff's personal injury claim arose in Honduras.486 Similarly, in
Gyenes v. Zionist Organization of America the First Department held
that defendants, in an action arising out of the death of a child attending a cultural program in Israel, were not entitled to dismissal on fo-

480. N.Y. CPLR 327 (McKinney 1992).
481. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245,478
N.Y.S.2d 597, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
482. See VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617,
524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988).
483. See 1.F.S. Int'l, Inc. v. S.L.M. Software, Inc., 174 A.D.2d 811, 570 N.Y.S.2d
745 (3d Dep't 1991) (held that doctrine of forum non wnveniens has no application
unless state court has first obtained personal jurisdiction over defendant).
484. See Cadet v. Short Line Terminal Agency, Inc., 173 A.D.2d 270,569 N.Y.S.2d
662 (1st Dep't 1991) (although residence of plaintiff is not sole determining factor on
forum nonwnveniens motion, it is generally the most siflcant factor in the equation);
Waterways Ltd. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 174 A.D.2d 324, 571 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1st Dep't
1991) (unless balance is strongly in favor of defendant, plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed by motion to dismiss made on grounds of forum non conveniens).
485. See Cadet, 173 A.D.2d 270, 569 N.Y.S.2d 662.
486. 176 A.D.2d 624, 575 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1st Dep't 1991).
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rum non conveniens grounds.487 In three other cases the appellate
division reversed supreme court decisions to grant CPLR 327 grounds
for causes of action that arose in New Jersey,4*8 Bermuda489 and
Jamaica.490

2. Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Court
Last year's Survey alerted the bench and bar to Borden v. Meqi
Milk Products where the circuit court held that the simple uniform
standard of Gulf Oil v. Gilbert permits reversal of a forum non conveniens determination only when there has been a very clear abuse of
discretion by the district c0urt.~9' During the Survey year the Second
Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint
on forum non conveniens gr0unds.~9*The circuit court held that the
district court erred in finding that issues of foreign law and access to
foreign witnesses were central to deciding the case.493 The circuit
court also held that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the defendant had met its burden of demonstrating that
trial in the Southern District of New York was inappropriate.494
3.

US.Supreme Court and Enforceability of Forum Selection
Clauses
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, a Washington State
-

-

-

487. 169 A.D.2d 551, 564 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1st Dep't 1991).
488. Mejia v. Car Trucking, Inc., 176 A.D.2d 592,575 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1st Dep't 1991)
(wrongful death action arising from automobile accident in New Jersey but both decedent
and allegedly negligent defendant were New York residents).
489. Waterways Limited, 174 A.D.2d 324, 571 N.Y.S.2d 208 (dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds improper even though all activities occurred in Bermuda because
loan agreement and note were executed in New York and provided that New York law
governed and note was payable in New York).
490. Berkmt v. National Car Rental, 175 A.D.2d 80, 573 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't
1991) (trial court abused its discretion in dismissing, on CPLR 327 grounds, action
brought by New York passenger of rental vehicle involved in accident in Jamaica against
New York husband of driver). See also David Siegel, Winning In Another Court by Violating The Condition of a N.L: Forum Non Conveniens Dismissak Any Consequence?, 380
N.Y. LAW DIG. August 1991.
491. 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cu. 1990) (citing Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)).
492. See R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chemical Co., Inc., 942 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.
1991).
493. Maganlal, 942 F.2d at 165.
494. Id. The Second Circuit noted that a district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens, but observed
that a court's discretion in this area is not so broad as to preclude meaningful appellate
review of its decisions. Id. at 167.
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couple purchased passage on a ship owned by the petitioner, a Florida-based cruise line.495 The petitioner sent respondents tickets containing a clause designating courts in Florida as the agreed-upon
forum for the resolution of disputes. The respondents boarded the
ship in Los Angeles, and, while in international waters off the Mexican coast, one of them suffered injuries when she slipped on a deck
mat. The respondents fled suit in a Washington Federal District
Court, which granted summary judgment for the petitioner. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter alm, that the forum selection clause should not be enforced under Bremen v. Zapata OflShore
Co. because it was not "freely bargained for," and because its enforcement would operate to deprive the respondents of their day in court in
light of evidence indicating that they were physically and financially
incapable of pursuing the litigation in Florida.496
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, held
that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the forum-selection clause.497 Justice Stevens fled a dissenting opinion in which JusThe Supreme Court began by noting that the
tice Marshall j0ined.~9~
case was in admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of
the forum selection clause. The Court explained that in Bremen, it
addressed the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in a contract
between two business corporati0ns.~99The Court held that, in general, "a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power, such as
that involved here, should be given full effect."Sm The Supreme Court
rejected the circuit court's finding that the Carnival Cruise forum selection clause was unenforceable because, unlike the parties in The
Bremen, respondents were not business persons and did not negotiate
the terms of the clause with petitioner. The Supreme Court also rejected the circuit court's alternative finding that the clause should not
be enforced because enforcement effectively would deprive respondents of an opportunity to litigate their claim against petitioner.501

495. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
496. Carnival Cruise Line, 11 1 S. Ct. at 1528 (citing Bremen v. Zapata OflShore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
497. Id.
498. Id at 1529-38 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
499. Id at 1525.
500. Id at 1526.
501. Carnival Cruise Line, 11 1 S. Ct. at 1523.
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The Supreme Court refined the analysis of Bremen to account for
the realities of form passage contracts. The Court stated:
A clause establishing ex ante the dispute resolution forum has the
salutary effect of dispelling confusion as to where suits may be
brought and defended, thereby sparing litigants time and expense
[of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum,] and conserving judicial r e s ~ u r c e s . ~ ~ ~

The Supreme Court concluded by holding that forum-selection
clauses contained in form passage contracts should not be set aside
absent a showing of a bad-faith motive, fraud or overreaching.rn3 The
dissent stressed that forum selection clauses in passenger tickets
should be reviewed with heightened scrutiny because they can involve
elements of adhesion and are usually offered on a take-or-leave basis
by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker
po~er.~W
The dissent also pointed out that the Bremen holding had
nothing to say about stipulations printed on the back of passenger
tickets. The dissent concluded by stating,
Under these circumstances, the general prohibition against stipulations purporting 'to lessen, weaken or avoid' the passenger's right
to a trial certainly should be construed to apply to the manifestly
unreasonable stipulation in these passenger's tickets. . . I would
continue to apply the general rule that prevailed prior to our decision in The Bremen to forum-selection clauses in passenger
tickets.Ms

.

4. The Bhopal Case
Prior Survey articles have tracked developments relating to the
Bhopal case." Two years have passed since Union Carbide paid the
Indian government 470 million dollars to the survivors of 1984's Bhopal disaster and for the families of the 3,700 persons who died. Less
than 5 million dollars has reached the intended beneficiaries. The rest
remains in government hands. Unlike the Ghandi administration,
-

-

Id. at 1526 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1533.
See Jay A. Carlisle, N.Y. Civil Practice, 1986 Survey of N.Y.Law, 38 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 67 (1987); Jay A. Carlisle, N.Y. Civil Practice, 1987 Survey of N.Y. Law, 39
SYRACUSE
L. REV. 75 (1988); Jay A. Carlisle, N.Y. Civil Practice, 1988 Survey, supra
note 470 at 77.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
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which approved the Union Carbide settlement offer in 1989, the present administration argues that Union Carbide is criminally responsible for the leak and has asked the Indian Supreme Court to reopen the
IV. RES JUDICATA
There were 24 significant res judicata cases decided during the
Survey year. New York courts applied the doctrine to 18 cases and
rejected it in six others.509 Most of these cases involved application of
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. The bottom line is that plain-

507. See Jeremy Main, Where Bhopal's Money Went, FORTUNE,
June 3,1991, at 17.
508. See Jason v. Chusid, 172 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1991) (atate pr-gs);
McCue v. Abel, 171 A.D.2d 845, 567 N.Y.S.2d 781 (2d Dep't 1991)
(tortious interference with contract action); Zisholtz v. Bank of New York, 171 A.D.2d
745, 567 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1991) (breached loan agreement); Delford Indus., Inc.,
v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conse~ation,171 A.D.2d 941, 566 N.Y.S.2d 984 (3d Dcp't
1991) (article 78 proceeding); Department of Hous. Presemation & Dev. v. Mill River
Realty, 169 A.D.2d 665, 565 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1st Dep't 1991) (estopped from arguing economic feasibility of repairing building); Owens v. New York City Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d
405 (2d Cu. 1991) (employee collaterally estopped from litigating subsequent age discrimination suit); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 764 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (res judicata given to arbitration award); Temple of Lost Sheep v. Abrams, 930
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1991) ( collateral estoppel in federal civil rights action); Milltex Industries Corp. v. Jacquard Lace Co., Ltd., 922 F.2d. 164 (2d Cir. 1991) (preclusive effect
given to state court judgment in federal court); Coopersmith v. Big Apple Credit Corp.,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 1991 (Civ. Ct., Queens Co. 1991) (action for damages against credit
agency); Goglino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cu. 1991) (civil rights claims);
Mishal Bin Saud v. The Bank of New York, 929 E2d 916 (2d Cir. 1991) (RICO claims
should have been raised earlier by counterclaim); Samuels v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 942
F.2d 834 (2d Cu. 1991) (Title VII lawsuit); Jacobson v. 201 W. 89 Owners, Inc., 173
A.D.2d 334, 575 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1st Dep't 1991) (real estate matter); People v. Roselle,
152 Misc. 2d 191, 575 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Co. Ct., Westchester Co. 1991) (family court finding given preclusive effect to stop subsequent criminal action); People v. Transworld Airlines, 171 A.D.2d 76, 575 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1991) (petitioner collaterally estopped
from relitigating issue of whether advertising was deceptive in light of prior finding in
federal court).
509. Loth v. 63 Associates, Inc., 170 A.D.2d 295,566 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1991)
(property purchase); Wollman v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 170 A.D.2d 673,
566 N.Y.S.2d 937 (2d Dep't 1991) (action by doctor to compel hospital to reinstate his
professional privileges); Deutsch v. Crosson, 172 A.D.2d 238, 567 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d
Dep't 1991) (action challenging facial constitutionality of statute setting annual salaries
of Family Court judges did not have res judicata effect in action challenging constitutionality of statute as applied); State of Gorman Brothers, Inc., 166 A.D.2d 859, 563
N.Y.S.2d 187 (3d Dep't 1990) (iidemnification from truck owner); Khandhar v.
Elfenbeii, 943 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1991) (arbitration finding does not collaterally estop
plaintiff from maintaining a claim of medical malpractice in federal court); People v.
Moses Tepfer, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1991, at 23, col. 3 (Crim. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991).
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tiff's counsel should become familiar with the doctrine in order to use
it offensively,510 and to screen cases that appear to be worthwhile on
the merits but may be "losers" when the doctrine is applied. Similarly, defense counsel should be alert to using a res judicata defense to
defeat an otherwise meritorious claim by a plaintiff.511
The most important res judicata cases during the Survey year
were the Court of Appeals decisions in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Zuk512 and In re Nassau Insurance Co.513 In addition there were
three other trial and appellate court decisions that set forth good tactical points for the bar to be aware of.

A.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Zuk

In this case, Zuk was cleaning a gun, which accidently discharged and caused Smith's death.514 Zuk pleaded guilty to second
degree manslaughter.515 Subsequently, the administratrix of Smith's
estate brought a wrongful death action against Zuk.516 Zuk sought
defense and indemnification from Allstate Insurance Company under
a homeowner liability policy issued to his parents. The policy covered
the home where the accident occurred. Allstate brought an action
seeking relief of its defense and indemnification obligation.517 Allstate
based its claim on the fact that its policy excepted coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to
result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or
which are in fact intended by an insured person."518 Allstate contended that preclusive effect should be granted to Zuk's criminal conviction for recklessly causing the death of Smith, therefore relieving
Allstate of its duty to indemnifv or defend Zuk. At the trial level,
Allstate moved for summary judgment and was denied.519 The Second Department reversed and granted Allstate summary judgment.520
The Second Department "held that Zuk's guilty plea in the criminal

5 10. See Carlisle, N.X Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 507.
51 1. See Carlisle, Getting A Full Bite of the Apple, 55 FORDHAM
L. REV.63 (1986).
512. 7 8 N.Y.2d 41, 574 N.E.2d 1035, 571 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1991).
513. 7 8 N.Y.2d 888, 577 N.E.2d 1039, 571 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1991).
514. Allstate Ins Co., 7 8 N.Y.2d at 41, 574 N.E.2d at 1035, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
515. Id
516. Id
517. Id at 43-44, 574 N.E.2d at 1036, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
518. Id at 44, 574 N.E.2d at 1036, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
519. Allstate Ins Co., 7 8 N.Y.2d at 41, 574 N.E.2d at 1035, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
520. Id
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proceeding established as a matter of law that Smith's death was
caused by a criminal act and therefore Zuk was collaterally estopped
from contesting that conclusively determined issue""1 in a subsequent civil action. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and
reversed the appellate division.
The Court, speaking through Judge Bellacosa, reasoned that
although the criminal conviction established that Zuk "recklessly"
caused Smith's death, the term "reckless" has different meanings in
criminal law and in civil law. Judge Bellacosa explained that behavior, which may be reckless for criminal responsibility purposes, does
not necessarily mean that the actor reasonably expected the accident
to result.522 Judge Bellacos concluded:
In sum, the issue whether Smith's death could 'reasonably be expected to result' from Zuk's acts was not necessarily determined in
the criminal proceeding and was not identical to the issues that
were determined there. Thus, Allstate should not be permitted to
use collateral estoppel to deprive the Zuks of their only opportunity to determine the effect, if any, of the conviction with its distinctively defined elements on the applicability of the exclusion
clause.523

Thus, it was not possible or appropriate to decide, as a matter of law,
whether Smith's death could "reasonably be expected to result" from
Zuk's acti0ns.~~4

2. Res Judicata Practice Tips
In Kokoletsos v. Semon, the Second Department held that since
the order of dismissal in an earlier action by plaintiffs against defendant was based on the fact that the court had lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the prior adjudication was not on the merits
and could not be relied upon by defendant for res judicata
purposes.=2'
In New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development v. B ~ b k e defendant
r ~ ~ ~ moved for an order for reargument of
a prior decision of the supreme court affirming a Civil Court Judg-

521. Id at 44, 574 N.E.2d at 1036-37, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
522. Id at 44, 574 N.E.2d at 1037, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
523. Id. at 46-47, 574 N.E.2d at 1038, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
524. Allstate I m G.,78 N.Y.2d at 47, 574 N.E.2d at 1038, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
525. 176 A.D.2d 786, 575 N.Y.S.2d 116 (2d Dep't 1991).
526. N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1991, at 29, col. 5 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.).
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ment. The Supreme Court of Kings County dismissed the motion on
the grounds that the defendant could show none of the elements necessary to grant a motion to re-argue and that the judgment was res
judicata and could not be disturbed simply because there had been a
subsequent change of decisional law.527
In Carino v. Town of Deerfield, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York held that the defendants were
not deemed to have waived the affirmative defense of res judicata by
failing to expressly assert it in their answer, despite the fact that Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the defense be
affirmatively pled in the answer.528 The District Court relied on the
circuit court's ruling in Weston Funding Corp. v. Lafayette Towers
Inc. ,529 which held that the defense can be raised by way of motion for
summary judgment so that the plaintiff is provided with an adequate
opportunity to present arguments rebutting the defense.530

The Court of Appeals issued three instructive opinions clarifying
when a summary judgment motion should be granted. The Court
also held that a defendant, who failed to provide particulars relating
to their counterclaims, could not be precluded from offering any defense to the plaintiffs complaint. In addition, the First Department
held that motion calendar rules conditioning the making of written
motions on prior judicial consent were improper. Also a supreme
court held that a party's inability to read English defeated a summary
judgment motion. Finally, there were several important state and federal decisions regarding the pleading with specificity rules and other
matters of interest to the federal practitioner.

A. Motion Practice
In Star v. Berridge,531 the Court of Appeals modified and affirmed a judgment of the appellate division granting summary judgment against the plaintiff's claims in a wrongful death action. The
Court held that in light of plaintifPs medical expert's aflidavit the appellate division should not have granted summary judgment on the
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

Bobker, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1991, at 29
750 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
410 F.2d 980 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1977).
Carino, 410 F. Supp. at 982.
77 N.Y.2d 899, 571 N.Y.S.2d 74, 568 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1991).
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issue of whether the defendant actually installed a lead shield as ordered by the New York State Department of Health.532 The Court
held that "summary judgment was properly granted [as] to the remaining defendants, because, on [the] record, they owed no duty of
care to the plaintiff or her decedent."533 In Pearce, Urstadt, Mayer &
Greer Realty Corp. v. Atrium Development Associates, the Court of
Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division granting summary judgment on the grounds that ambiguities in the brokerage
agreement made summary judgment inappropriate in a suit by a loan
broker to recover its commission.534 Judge Kaye dissented because
she believed the majority's interpretation of any ambiguity in the brokerage agreement was contrary to established principles of contract
In Fiore v. Oakwood Plaza Shopping Center, Inc., the Court of
Appeals affirmed the granting of a summary judgment in lieu of complaint.5s6 The plaintiffs, who had obtained a money judgment in
Pennsylvania, sought to enforce it in New York pursuant to CPLR
3213.537 The supreme court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and concluded that the Pennsylvania court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The supreme court also found "that
due process requirements had been satisfied, and that the judgments
were valid and conclusive in the forum state."53* AS a result, the
court concluded, the Pennsylvania judgments were entitled to full
faith and ~redit.~39The appellate division afErmed. On appeal, defendants attempted to argue the merits of the Pennsylvaniajudgment.
In addition, defendants argued that cognovit judgments as a matter of
law are not entitled to full faith and credit in New York. The Court
of Appeals held that defendants had voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived their rights to notice and an opportunity to be
heard.540The Court stated "The facts clearly demonstrate that such a
valid waiver was effected, according to plaintiffs, and therefore the

532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.

Star, 77 N.Y.2d at 899, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 74, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
Id. at 901, 571 N.E.2d at 75, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
77 N.Y.2d 490, 571 N.E.2d 60, 568 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1991).
Pea= Urstadt, 77 N.Y.2d at 495-96, 571 N.E.2d at 63, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
7 8 N.Y.2d 572, 585 N.E.2d 364, 578 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1991).
Fiore, 78 N.Y.2d at 576, 585 N.E.2d at 365, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
Id. at 576-77, 585 N.E.2d at 366, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
Id. at 577, 585 N.E.2d at 367, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
Id. at 581, 585 N.E.2d at 368, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
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Pennsylvania judgment should be afforded full faith and credit."541
In Hochberg v. Davis, the First Department held that "Information Sheets" of various parts of the Supreme Court could not condition the making of written motions on prior judicial consent.542 The
appellate division recognized that the practice of conditioning the
making of motions on prior judicial approval may discourage the iiling of frivolous motions but concluded that it may prevent a party
from exercising the option to move for relief to which he may be entitled.543 The appellate division stated:
Denying a party permission to engage in motion practice hinders
the performance of counsel who are encouraged and, in fact, are
required to be zealous in their representation of their clients.54

Insofar as any inclination of the part of counsel to fle frivolous motions, the appellate division noted that practice may be discouraged
by the court's authority to impose sanctions.545
In Great Eastern Bank v. Chen,546 the plaintiff moved for summary judgment against defendants, the individual guarantors of eight
promissory notes that had gone into default. The court denied plaintiff summary judgment against one of the defendants on the ground
that since he was unable to read or understand English his allegation
that plaintiff had failed to inform him that he was personally guaranteeing the obligation raised an issue of fact to be resolved by trial.547

B. Pleading
During the Survey year New York state and federal appellate
courts made it clear that the practitioner must comply with rules
which require that all averments of fraud or mistake must be pled
with particularity.548 Malice, intent, knowledge and other conditions
of mind of a person may be averred generally.549 Also the Second
-

-

-

-

541. Id at 577, 585 N.E.2d at 366, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
542. 171 A.D.2d 192, 195, 575 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (1st Dep't 1991).
543. Hochberg, 171 A.D.2d at 194, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 312
544. Id. at 195, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
545. Id
546. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1991, at 24 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1991).
547. Great eastern Bank, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 13, 1991, at 24.
548. See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); O'Brien v.
National Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1991); Breard v. Sachnoff &
Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
549. See Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 E2d 142 (2d Ci.1991).
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Circuit rendered important decisions with respect to sua sponte dismi~sals,5~0
appeals,551 enforcement of judgments552 and dismissals
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).553
In Williams v. Varig Brazilian Airlines,554 the First Department
held that slander claims had not been pleaded with required particularity. The plaintiff was precluded from alleging that remarks made
by her supervisor were slanderous, by failure to comply with procedural requirements that she list specific dates and places where the
alleged statements were made and names of persons who overheard
them.555
Four decisions of the Second Circuit alert the bench and bar to
the strict compliance pleading requirements of Rules 12(b)(6) and
9(b). In Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., the bottom line is that the
purpose of Rule 9(b) is threefold - (1) it is designed to provide a
defendant with fair notice of a plaintiff's claim, (2) to safeguard a
defendant's reputation from improvident charges of wrongdoing, and
(3) to protect a defendant against the institution of a strike suit.556
Thus, although Rule 9(b) permits knowledge to be averred generally,
it requires plaintiffs "to plead the factual basis which gives rise to a
'strong inference' of fraudulent intent."557
In Thomas v. SculZy,558 and Scottish Air International, Inc. v.
British Caledonian Group, PLC,559 the Second. Circuit limited the dis-

550. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1991) (sua sponte dismissal on
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12@)(6) motion is not favored); Scottish Air Int'l Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 945 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1991) (sua sponte grant of summaryjudgment not
favored).
551. See Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 E2d 79 (2d Cir. 1991)
(appeal dismissed for mootness); Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l
Petroleum Corp., 948 E2d 111 (2d Cir. 1991) (appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
under the collateral order doctrine); Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1991) (rule 54@) certification is abuse of discretion and therefore circuit
court lacks jurisdiction on appeal); United States v. Levy, 947 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1991)
(interlocutory appeal unavailable in criminal case to review challenge to personal
jurisdiction).
552. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Ci.1991) (strictly applying
Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(A) directs that the laws of New York State be applied in enforcing a
judgment obtained in a federal court located in New York).
553. See Cortec Indus., Inc. v Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991).
554. 169 A.D.2d 434, 564 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1st Dep't 1991).
555. Williams, 169 A.D.2d at 434, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
556. 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991).
557. Kmnter, 937 F.2d at 776.
558. 943 E2d 259 (2d Cir. 1991).
559. 945 E2d 53 (2d Ci. 1991).
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trict court's discretion to dismiss plaintifE's claims sua sponte under
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. The circuit court pointed out that sua
sponte dismissals for a failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted should not be granted unless the plaintiff is given an opportunity to be heard. The Second Circuit also reminded the bar that the
ten day notice rule contained in Rule 56(c) is applicable to all but
"exceptional" ~ases.~60In Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding
Ltd.,s61 the Second Circuit expanded the power of federal district
courts to grant 12(b)(6) dismissals in securities cases. The court held
that the district court is not required to limit its inquiry regarding the
complaint's viability to its four corners, but may consider documents
plaintiffs relied upon even though plaintiff did not attach these papers
to, or incorporate them by reference in, the complaint.562
In United States v. Paccione, the circuit court reminded the bar
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(A) will be strictly applied
and that the laws of New York State will be applied when enforcing a
judgment obtained in a federal court located in New York.563

C Bills of Particulars
In Northway Engineering, Inc. v. Felix Industries, Inc., the Court
of Appeals was faced with the question of whether an order of preclusion, entered when the defendants failed to provide particulars relating to their counterclaims, also precluded the defendants from
offering any defense to the complaint.564 The Court, speaking
through Chief Judge Wachtler, explained that any party may demand
disclosure of evidence, or information leading to evidence, without
regard to the burden of proof.565 The Chief Judge stressed that a bill
of particulars is a more limited device and that its purpose is to amplify or supplement a pleading. Chief Judge Wachtler noted that the
plaintiff demanded particulars only with respect to the counterclaims.
Thus, when the defendants failed to comply with the demand, the
trial court properly precluded the defendants from proceeding on the
counterclaims, but erred when it gave the preclusion order the addi-

560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.

Scottish Air Int., 945 F.2d at 55.
949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991).
Cortes Idus., 949 F.2d at 44.
949 F.2d 1183 (2d Ci.1991).
77 N.Y.2d 332, 569 N.E.2d 437, 567 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1991).
Northway Eng'g, 77 N.Y.2d at 336, 569 N.E.2d at 439, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
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tional effect of depriving the defendants of their general denials.566
Judge Kaye dissented and explained that plaintiff's request for a
bill of particulars was not addressed merely to defendants' counter"[ilnstead, plaintiff's request was directed to
c l a i m ~ .She
~ ~ stated
~
specific paragraphs of the answer which defendant itself had denominated 'counterclaim and defense.' "568 Judge Kaye also stressed that
defendants calculated indifference to the CPLR "should not be rewarded by now reversing summary judgment."569 She stated:
That is an improper result in this case, and a very poor example for
other cases. Plaintiff should have the balance due on its contract
rather than defendants' renewed foot-dragging, discovery runarounds, and litigation in the trial court-as well as a bill of costs
from us.570

VII. DISCLOSURE
The Court of Appeals rendered an important decision regarding
the application of the attorney-client privilege to corporate investigations.571 There were other important opinions issued with respect to
the attorney-client and work product privileges, expert witnesses, and
the notice requirement under CPLR 3120. Discovery was limited in
DES cases and several courts limited the right of a motion to strike in
discovery cases. Finally, the Fourth Department followed the First
Department's decision in Marte v. KO. Hick01 Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. ,572 and held that a plaintiff was entitled to the discovery of surveillance videos.573

A. Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Investigations
In Spectrum Systems International Corporation v. Chemical
Bank, the Court of Appeals held that a report, prepared by a law firm
during an internal investigation of possible fraud by employees of its
566. Id. at 335, 569 N.E.2d at 439, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
567. Id at 338, 569 N.E.2d at 441, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 638 (Kaye, J. dissenting).
568. Id
569. Id. at 339, 569 N.E.2d at 442, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
570. Northway Eng'g, 77 N.Y.2d at 339, 569 N.E.2d at 442, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
571. See Spectrum Systems Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 581
N.E.2d 1051, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1991).
572. 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 1991). See also DiMichel v.
South Buffalo Ry. Co., 181 A.D.2d 1075, 585 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dep't 1992). But see
Careccia v. Enstrom, 174 A.D.2d 48, 578 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3d Dep't 1992).
573. Marte, 154 A.D.2d at 178, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
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client, was privileged.574The Court, speaking through Judge Kaye,
held that the privilege is limited to communications and not the underlying facts. Also, the communication must be made to facilitate
the rendition of legal advice or ~ervices.~~5
Judge Kaye reasoned that
"while information received from third persons may not itself be privileged . . . a lawyer's communication to a client that includes such
information in its legal analysis and advice may stand on different
footing."576 Judge Kaye emphasized the Court's holding in Rossi v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York 577 and stressed that
to be protected, the communication need only be "primarily or
predominantly of a legal character."578 Thus, the Court recognized
how the privilege works in practice. The Spectrum Systems decision
should be welcomed by corporations who are engaged in self policing.
It represents an important contribution to the policy of encouraging
open communication in the corporate context.
B. Attorney-Client, Doctor-Patient and Work Product Privilege
In Cooper-Rutter Assoc. v. Anchor National Life, the Appellate
Division, First Department held that handwritten memoranda prepared by a person who was both in-house counsel and the corporate
secretary to one defendant were not shielded from discovery by the
attorney-client privilege.579 The appellate division stressed that the
documents were not primarily of a legal character, but expressed substantial non-legal concerns.580 In a similar matter the Third Department reversed and m d i e d a supreme court order which denied
plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure of certain materials which defendant had claimed were exempt from discovery as privileged attorney-client communications.581
In Soper v. Wilkinson Match, Inc., plaintifs personal injury action sought recovery for injuries they sustained as the result of a defective lawn mower.582The supreme court partially granted plaintiffs'
motion to compel discovery, and defendant appealed. The Third De574. 78 N.Y.2d 371, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 575 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1991).
575. Id. at 377, 581 N.E.2d at 1060, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
576. Id.
577. 73 N.Y.2d 588, 540 N.E.2d 703, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1989).
578. Rossi, 73 N.Y.2d at 595, 540 N.E.2d at 706, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
579. 168 A.D.2d 663, 563 N.Y.S.2d 491 (2d Dep't 1990).
580. Cooper-Ritter Assoc., 168 A.D.2d 663, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
581. Id. at 664, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
582. 176 A.D.2d 1025, 575 N.Y.S2d 180 (3d Dep't 1991).
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partment held that a list of other products liability claims involving
lawn mowers manufactured by the defendant's predecessor-in-interest
was not immune from discovery as privileged attorney work product
unless there was a showing that any particular legal skills were necessary to compile the list.583 Finally, in Rodriguez v. New York City
Transit Authority, the supreme court held that medical tests performed on a subway motorman after his train was involved in an accident were not protected by the doctor-patient privilege.584 The court
stressed that the motorman had not been injured in the accident, but
agreed to be tested pursuant to a stipulation between his union and
the Transit Authority. The supreme court distinguished Koump v.
Smith and Dillenbeck v. Hess586 on the grounds that in those cases
the rulings, relied upon by the defense for protective orders against
disclosure, were applied to drivers of vehicles who had been injured
by accidents. The supreme court also refused to follow a decision last
year which sustained the doctor-patient privilege to after-accident
medical tests performed on two bus drivers.587
C. Expert Witness Cases
In Jasopersaud v. Rho, the Appellate Division, Second Department formulated useful guidelines for determining what information
must be disclosed with respect to the "qualifications" of each expert
witness under CPLR 3 101(d).588 The appellate division, speaking
through Justice Sybil Hart Kooper, held that items requesting the
medical school attended by the expert and the expert's board certifications, experts area of special expertise, jurisdictions of expert's licensure, and location of expert's internships, residencies and fellowships,
were proper inquiries bearing upon qualifications of an expert. The
appellate division held that dates associated with attainment of those
qualifications did not have to be provided. Also, a demand for the
expert's present hospital affiliations did not have to be provided and
requests for the description of "every medical and/or medical record,
textbook, and "all" treatises and/or articles relied on by the expert

583. Soper, 176 A.D.2d at 1025, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
584. 151 Misc. 2d 1027, 574 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1991).
585. 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d 857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969).
586. 73 N.Y.2d 278, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1989).
587. See Tillman v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 1990, at
21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1990).
588. 169 A.D.2d 184, 572 N.Y.S.2d 700 (2d Dep't 1991).
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were overly broad.589
In Parsons v. City of New York, the Appellate Division, First Department set forth helpful guidelines with respect to the pre-trial disclosure of an expert's testimony.590 The appellate division held that
the defendants violated their obligation to disclose a summary of the
expert's testimony when they did not mail the summary until one year
after the expert inspected the site and only five days before the scheduled start of trial. The appellate division also held that the defendants
gave plaintiff a misleading summary that did not fairly and accurately
reflect the expert's testimony at trial.591 Accordingly, the appellate
division reversed a jury verdict in favor of the defendants and remanded the case for a new trial.
In LiIIis v. D'Souza, the Appellate Division, Third Department
held that the statute requiring disclosure of experts and their opinions
does not require a party to retain an expert at any specific time.592 In
the absence of intentional or willful nondisclosure by the defendants,
the expert testimony could be presented even though the defendants
did not respond until the second day of trial to the demand for disclosure of the expert's report under CPLR 3101(d)(l)(i).593

D. Notice Requirements under CPLR 3120
In Mendelowitz v. Xerox Corp., the Appellate Division, First Department clarified when the phrases "all," "all other," or "any and
all" may be used in a request for discovery of documents under CPLR
3120.594 The appellate division explained that the burden of specification in notice for production of documents is on the requesting party.
The appellate division also explained that the use of such phrases as
"any and all" does not automatically render a document request improper.595 The appellate division noted that exceptions have been
found "in certain limited circumstances" where "the use of these
phrases may relate to specific subject matter" and does not therefore
impede a ready identification of the particular object to be produced."6 Thus, the First Department modified an order of the
-

-

589. Jaspersaud, 169 A.D.2d at 84, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
590. 175 A.D.2d 783, 573 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dep't 1991).
591. Parsons, 175 A.D.2d at 784, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
592. 174 A.D.2d 936, 572 N.Y.S.2d 136 (4th Dep't 1991).
593. Lillis, 174 A.D.2d at 936, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
594. 169 A.D.2d 300, 573 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dep't 1991).
595. Mendelowitz, 169 A.D.2d at 303, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
596. Id. at 304, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
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supreme court and stressed that the plaintiff should strive to use other
disclosure devices to meet his burden of specificity.

E. Discovery Limited in DES Cases
In In Re New York Count DES Litigation, the Appellate Division, First Department held that the physician-patient privilege
barred access to any records, except those of mothers during the pregnancy period.597 Justice Asch analyzed the issue of whether the relatives of some 800 plaintiffs had waived their physician-patient
privilege in terms of basic privacy rights. Justice Asch noted that both
state and federal courts have increasingly accepted the idea that a
right of privacy exists. He modified the supreme court's order, on the
law and facts and in the exercise of discretion "to limit the disclosure
of such records to the ingesting mother's medical history during the
period of gestation . . . ."598

F. Motions to Strike
There were seven important appellate division decisions rendered
during the Survey year which discussed the merits of striking a plead~ ~ decisions
ing for failure to comply with a discovery r e q ~ e s t . 5These
remind the bench and bar that the sanction of striking a pleading is a
drastic one which should only be imposed where the moving party
establishes that failure to disclose is willful, contumacious or in bad
faith. The decisions also point to the availability of sanctions for discovery abuses under Part 130 of the new uniform rules of court.600
G. Miscellaneous
There were several other interesting disclosure decisions rendered during the Survey year. Preaction disclosure under CPLR
3102(c) is generally not favored in New York. In Bliss v. Jafin, the
Appellate Division, First Department reversed the supreme court's
597. 168 A.D.2d 44, 570 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1991).
598. DES Litigation, 168 A.D.2d at 48, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
599. See Ahroni v. City of New York, 175 A.D.2d 789, 572 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep't
1991);Forman v. J a m m y Corp., 175 A.D.2d 514, 572 N.Y.S.2d 782 (3d Dep't 1991);
Roof v. Bogdanski, 174 A.D.2d 1046, 572 N.Y.S.2d 825 (4th Dep't 1991); Bufogle v.
Pesiri, 171 A.D.2d 833,567 N.Y.S.2d 769 (2d Dep't 1991);Nudelman v. New York City
Transit Authority, 172 A.D.2d 503, 567 N.Y.S.2d 851 (2d Dep't 1991); American Reliance Ins. Co. v. National General Ins. Co., 174 A.D.2d 591, 571 N.Y.S.2d 493 (2d Dep't
1991);Sieden v. Copen, 170 A.D.2d 262, 565 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1st Dep't 1991).
600. See Part 130 of the Uniform Rules of the Trial Court (22 NYRCC 130-1.1).
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decision to permit preaction disclosure and held that the plaintiff had
failed to show sufficient factual basis for disclosure.601 In Hughes v.
Witco Corporation-Chemprene Division, the Appellate Division, Third
Department held that the trial court had improperly refused a request
for preaction disclosure.602 The Third Department speaking through
Justice Yesawich stated "she is entitled to conduct pretrial discovery
to identifl and to discover the precise facts needed to draft the pleadings. . . ."603
In Mihalakis, D. O., v. Cabrini Medical Center, the Appellate Division, First Department reminded the bench and bar that "[tlhe
courts are mindful of allowing pro se litigants some leeway to prosecute their actions."604 In Anonymous v. State Department of Health,
the Third Department held that where there is express statutory authority for issuance of subpoenas, CPLR 2307 does not apply.605 Finally, the New York State Bar Association's Committee on
Commercial and Federal Litigation has issued a report proposing a
series of pre-trial procedural reforms to "effect cost and time saving
. . . without any significant further appropriation of public funds."606
VII. SANCTIONSCASES
Prior Survey articles have discussed the development of sanction
case law in New York but this is the first piece to devote a specific
section to this area of the law. During the Survey year important
sanction cases were issued by state and federal courts.

A. US.Supreme Court
In Chambers v. Nasco Inc., the Supreme Court expanded the
power of federal courts to impose sanction^.^^ The Court held that a
district court, sitting in diversity, properly invoked its inherent power
to impose sanctions upon a party for bad faith conduct without relying on a statute or rule.608 The Court also held that federal courts
sitting in diversity can use their inherent power to assess attorney fees
601. 176 A.D.2d 106, 573 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1st Dep't 1991).
602. 175 A.D.2d 486, 572 N.Y.S.2d 531 (3d Dep't 1991).
603. Hughes, 175 A.D.2d at 488, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
604. 176 A.D.2d 589, 590, 574 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (1st Dep't 1991).
605. 173 A.D.2d 988, 569 N.Y.S.2d 500 (3d Dep't 1991).
606. Spencer, Reform of Pre-Trial Procedures Will Cut Court Costs, N.Y. L.J.,Jan.
3, 1992, at 1.
607. 1 1 1 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
608. Chambers, 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 2127.
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as a sanction for bad faith conduct even if applicable state laws do not
recognize a bad faith exception for the general rule against fee
shifting.In Chambers, the district court had imposed sanctions on a party
who had (1) attempted to deprive the court of jurisdiction by acts of
fraud, (2) filed false and frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempted, by
other tactics of delay, oppression, harassment and massive expense to
reduce the plaintiff to exhausted compliance.610 The district court
recognized that the conduct in the first and third categories could not
be reached by Rule 11, which governs only papers filed with the
court. The district court also explained that the falsity of the pleadings did not become apparent until after the trial on the merits, so
that it would have been impossible to assess sanctions at the time the
papers were filed. Consequently the district court deemed Rule 11
insdlicient for its purposes. The district court also declined to impose
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 9 1927 against a party. The court therefore
relied on its inherent power in imposing sanctions. The Supreme
Court affirmed.611 Thus, district courts can be expected to apply
sanctions irrespective of the availability of any rule or statute authorizing the imposition of a sanction or penalty.
In Business Guides, Inc. v Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a
Rule 11 sanction could be imposed on a party based on z finding by
the district court that reasonable inquiry was not made by the party
prior to signing a temporary restraining order application and a subsequent aflidavit.612 The Court decided the issue pursuant to the plain
meaning of the Rule. Because the language of the rule itself does not
limit the imposition of sanctions to pro se parties, the Supreme Court
declined to accept petitioners argument that it should be so limited.
Next, the Court determined that the appropriate standard for imposing Rule 11 sanctions on a party is a "reasonable under the circumstances" test.613Thus, any party who signs a paper or document will
be responsible for its contents with regard to any Rule 11 sanctions.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.

Id. at 2123.
Id.
Id.
111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 923.
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B. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit issued several interesting sanctions decisions.
In United States of America v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Second Circuit vacated a district court sanction order and
remanded the case for clarification as to the standards for application
of Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. 8 1927(fn) and the inherent powers of the
The Teamsters decision also provides instructive guidelines
for the bench and bar when faced with sanction motions. The Second
Circuit also ruled that district courts have power to impose Rule 11
sanctions even when they lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a dispute.615 Also a sanction of more than $60,000
imposed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court on a former White Plains solo
practitioner was unanimously reversed by the Second Circuit.616
In Farino v. Walshe, the Second Circuit held that a lawyer could
not deduct a portion of his Rule 11 sanction from a settlement fund
set aside for his clients.617The Court also directed the lawyer to show
cause as to why he should not be assessed sanctions under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for filing an appeal.618 In Healey v.
Press, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's imposition of
san~tions.~l9
In light of the abuse of discretion standard being applied
pursuant to Cooter v. Hartmam,620 this decision was unexpected.621
The Second Circuit stressed the fact that the district court did not
give appellant a proper opportunity to oppose the motion for sanctions and to augment the record with appropriate countervailing evidence. The court concluded that the district court's imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11 and section 1l(e) of the SEC Act constituted
an abuse of discretion.622

C Court of Appeals
There were two significant sanctions decisions in the New York
Court of Appeals during the Survey year. In Maroulis v. 64th Street614. 948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cu. 1991).
615. See Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124 (2d C i . 1991).
616. See Matter o f Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc., 931 F.2d 222 (1991).
617. 938 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1991).
618. Farino, 938 F.2d at 8.
619. 947 F.2d 61 1 (2d Cu. 1991).
620. 496 U.S.384 (1990).
621. See Carlisle, Avoiding the Chancellor's Boot: Application of Sanctions in FedB.J. 287 (1991).
eral District and Appellate court Practice, 18 WESTCHES~ER
622. Healey, 947 E2d at 623.
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Third Avenue Associates, the Court of Appeals imposed sanctions in
the amount of $2,500 on an attorney.623 The Court held that the attorney's motion for leave to appeal from a nonfinal order involving an
accounting for a dissolved partnership was frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130.1.l(a) & (c). The Court stated:
No reasonable argument can be made that the current motion is
within the jurisdiction of this Court. The persistent course of
party-attorney Bert's frivolous and meritless motion practice in
this Court, including motions clearly outside the Court's jurisdiction and repetitive motions for reargument, constitutes a strategy
undertaken primarily to delay resolution of the litigation . ... This
abuse of the judicial process supports the imposition of
sanctions.624
In Intercontinental Credit Corporation Division of Pan American
Trade Development Corp. v. Roth, the Court of Appeals held that
sanctions would be imposed separately upon the appellant and his attorney, in the amount of $2,500 each.625 The Court stated that "[ilt is
clear that the present motion was 'undertaken primarily to delay or
prolong' the Israeli enforcement proceedings. This is precisely the
type of misuse of judicial process that part 130 was adopted to
curtd."626
D. Appellate Division Sanction Cases
There were at least twelve signscant part 130 sanction decisions
In addition two appellate divirendered during the Survey ~ear.~27

623. 77 N.Y.2d 831, 567 N.E.2d 978, 566 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1991).
624. Maroulis, 77 N.Y.2d at 831, 567 N.E.2d at 978, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
625. 78 N.Y.2d 306, 579 N.E.2d 688, 574 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1991).
626. Intercontinental Credit Corp., 78 N.Y.2d at 308, 579 N.E.2d at 1089, 574
N.Y.S.2d at 529.
627. See Papakostas v. Harkins, 171 A.D.2d 733, 567 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't
1991); Santangelo v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 169 A.D.2d 692, 565 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dep't
1991); Wallace v. Rockville Centre Union Free School District, 167 A.D.2d 392, 561
N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1990); Belsky v. Belsky, 175 A.D.2d 900, 573 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2d
Dep't 1991); Harley v. Harley, 170 A.D.2d 779,565 N.Y.S.2d 625 (3d Dep't 1991); Creative Bath Product v. Connecticut General L i e Ins. Co., 173 A.D.2d 400, 570 N.Y.S.2d
31 (1st Dep't 1991); Donovan A. Lewis v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 171 A.D.2d 731, 567
N.Y.S.2d 286 (2d Dep't 1991); Kernisan v. Taylor, 171 A.D.2d 869, 567 N.Y.S.2d 794
(2d Dep't 1991); Edwards v. Edwards, 165 A.D.2d 362, 567 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't
1991); Levin v. Axelrod, 168 A.D.2d 178, 571 N.Y.S.2d 345 (3d Dep't 1991); Rosenman
Colin Freund Lewis & Cohen v. Edelman, 165 A.D.2d 533,568 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1st Dep't
1991); Liker v. Grossman, 175 A.D.2d 911, 573 N.Y.S.2d 749 (2d Dep't 1991).
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sions imposed sanctions under CPLR 8303-a.628 Three of these decisions are particularly worthy of mention. In Liker v. Grossman, the
Second Department imposed a $9,500 sanction on an appellate lawyer.629 The plaintiff's case was originally dismissed in New York
County. The plaintiff then filed the same action in Kings County
where it was dismissed. The plaintiff's appeal was rejected by the
Second Department who then ordered the parties to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed. The Second Department based its
decision on the fact that the plaintiff and his lawyer were misusing the
judicial resources of the court and that this was by and of itself sanctionable conduct. Another interesting decision involved a sanction
imposed on a lawyer by the First Department.
In Rosenman Colin v. Edelman, the First Department based its
decision on the frivolous motion practice of defendant's attorney.630
The appellate division stated: "However, the propriety of making the
motion aside, we cannot overlook Sutton's flouting of well-understood
norms of motion practice requiring the moving party to set forth
whatever it is he has to say in papers accompanying the notice of
motion . . . ."63 I
In Edwards v. Edwards, the First Department reversed a decision
of the trial court to impose a $10,000 sanction against a matrimonial
lawyer who allegedly was having a sexual relationship with his client.632 The appellate division, speaking through Justice Sullivan, explained that pursuant to section 130-l.l(c) of the Uniform Rules for
the New York State Trial Courts, conduct is frivolous if "it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by a
reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing la~."~33Justice Sullivan concluded that where the allegedly
frivolous conduct consisted of the attorneys refusal to withdraw as
counsel, the party who sought to compel him to do so must establish
that there was a clear an unequivocal duty to do so under the existing
law. Absent such a showing, the trial court erred in imposing the
c
sanction.

628. See Grasso v. Mathew, 164 A.D.2d 476, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991);
Jacobson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 174 A.D.2d 709,571 N.Y.S.2d 559 (2d Dep't 1991).
629. 175 A.D.2d 911, 573 N.Y.S.2d 749 (2d Dep't 1991).
630. 165 A.D.2d 533, 568 N.Y.S.2d 590.
631. Rosenman, 165 A.D.2d at 536, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
632. 165 A.D.2d 362, 567 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1991).
633. Id. at 366.
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E. Sanction Cases In Trial Courts
During the Survey year New York State trial courts vigorously
imposed sanctions in litigants and their counse1.634 Three cases merit
mention. In Sher v. Scott, the supreme court denied sanction requests
on the grounds that counsel for both sides engaged in unprofessional
c0nduct.~3~
The court found that both counsel were unprofessional
and obnoxious. In Robinson v. Ross, a Justice Court for the Village of
Scarsdale imposed sanction under CPLR 8303-a against a defendant's
Finally, in Solow v.
attorney who had advanced a frivolous defen~e.~~6
WeZZner, a Civil Court judge imposed $186,000 in sanctions against an
attorney representing a landlord in a rent-strike
The judge
assessed $3,000 in sanctions for each of the 62 rent-disputes that went
to judgment during the trial.

We are again grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions
from our colleagues of the bench and bar and in academia. I am particularly t h a M to the 1992 graduating class of the Pace University
School of Law for keeping me alert to new developments in New
York Civil Practice. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions from
lawyers who have attended CLE classes I have taught at the Practising Law Institute, New York State Trial Lawyers Institute, Defense
Association of New York, New York County Lawyers Association,
White Plains Bar Association and the Office of Court Administration.

634. See Arthur Young & Co. v. Feerick, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 1991, at 21, (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1991); Lightron Corp. v. J.S.M. Holdings, Inc., 149 Misc. 2d 617, 567 N.Y.S.2d
976 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1990); Forstman v. Arluck, 149 Misc. 2d 929, 566 N.Y.S.2d
462 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1991); Willer v. 61 Jane Street Tenants Corp., N.Y.L.J., Aug.
25, 1991, at 25, (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991 ); Charney v North Jersey Trading Corp.,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1991, at 23 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991).
635. N.Y.L.J., Aug 27, 1991, at 25 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1991).
636. 149 Misc. 2d 289, 564 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Just. Ct., Westchester Co. 1990).
637. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 1991, at 1 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1991).
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